Mental causation supervenience/exclusion argument

This type of objection to nonreductive materialism is central to the work of Jaegwon Kim. Kim discusses this objection extensively in the various versions of his exclusion argument or supervenience argument. He holds that the only way to give mental properties a causal role is to functionally reduce them to physical properties, since physical causation will always rule out causation in virtue of irreducible mental... 

If these are the only kinds of cases that can be called cases of causal overdetermination, then Kim is right that it is absurd to think that all cases of mental causation are cases of overdetermination. If we use the term overdetermination as Kim seems to here, then we should reject the idea that P is causally overdetermined by M and P. Surely M and P are not completely independent and individually sufficient causes for P. Rather, M and P are related by supervenience (and possibly also by realization and event identity as well). It is not as if M could have caused P even if P had not occurred. If P had not occurred, M would not have occurred either - M depends on P for its existence. Thus, it seems plausible to accept premise (7) in Kim s exclusion argument - i.e. that P is not causally overdetermined by M and P. 

Kim s criticisms of nonreductive materialism attempt to show, primarily through the use of his exclusion or supervenience argument, that irreducible mental properties carmot be causal properties. I argue, against this, that the reductionist picture of causation created by the exclusion principle is deeply mistaken, and I offer an accoxmt of how irreducible mental properties can be causal properties. 

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