Irreducible emergence

In conclusion, in the unified theory the state of any system is described by means of probabilities that are inherent in the nature of the system and that are associated with measurement results obtained from an ensemble of systems of unambiguous preparation. Moreover, the second law of thermodynamics emerges as a fundamental law related to irreducible quantal dispersions of mixed states and applicable to systems of any size, including a single particle. 

Thus, the fact that there are no strict psycho-physical causal laws should not rule out the causal efficacy of mental properties. The fact that we cannot cite mental properties in our strict laws does not mean that mental properties cannot be causal properties. Biological properties are not eited in strict laws, but yet they are the types of properties we think of as eausal in seience. Strict laws wiU always (or at least almost always) be in terms of physies, yet there are many properties at higher levels of organization that we believe to be causal properties. These considerations seem to leave open the possibility that mental properties too eould be eausal, even though they ean never be cited in strict laws. This, of course, does not prove that mental properties are causal properties. What it does show is that the anomalism of the mental does not rule out the causal efficacy of mental properties. More needs to be said on this subject before a positive account of mental causation can emerge. But at least now, we are in a position where we can begin to set forth a theory of how irreducible mental properties could be... 

A Primitive is the smallest entity in a Feature which is irreducible and does not have a member but only a description and characteristics. The categorization of an entity to become a primitive is based on the possibility of errors emerging from the entity. Narrowing the scope of concern to the smallest entity is meant to confine the source of error to the smallest basic characteristic in such a way that the error is boundable and distinguished from the other sources of error. 

In Chapter 5.1, Reduction, Emergence and Physicalism Robin Hendry sets out the general framework within which the issue of reduction is addressed by philosophers, distinguishing between the issues of intertheoretic and ontological reduction as they apply to chemistry. The former issue has classically been the central topic of debate in the philosophy of science. Yet even if chemical theories are irreducible to physical theories, there remains the question of ontological reduction is the subject matter of chemistry in some sense just that of physics ... 

---