Fuels, alternative lessons learned

The experiences of the past few decades, however, provide a rich and unique historical perspective to examine new government transportation strategies. Three Asilomar presentations look to past experiences for lessons learned. The first two chapters are.by alternative fuel veterans from the DOE and DaimlerChrysler, and the third by two experienced alternative fuel researchers. All three chapters assess past experiences with technology development, investment, and regulation and policy. They offer perspectives on how hydrogen and fuel cell technologies can best be promoted by the government to avoid the pitfalls that hampered past efforts. 

It is evident that a careful assessment has not been made of lessons already learned from previous alternative fuel policies. Chapter 12 in this volume by McNutt and Rodgers discusses the consequences in the United States of earlier policies that emphasized using certain niche markets. They suggest that current hydrogen programs would have been designed differently if those lessons had been taken into account. The situation in the E.U. is the same hardly any connection to lessons learned in past policies. 

Lessons Learned from 15 Years of Alternative Fuels Experience—1988 to 2003... 

What, if anything, does the 15-year experience with alternative fuels, and the lessons learned, tell us about the upcoming hydrogen transition We think the lessons learned should be studied in detail by those who have the most to gain from a successful introduction of hydrogen as a transportation fuel, and also by those who have the most to lose from less than full success. We believe the numerous analyses and models developed to assess alternative fuels should now be harnessed to help chart the most effective course toward a hydrogen future. In particular, we have made five overarching observations drawn from the experience with alternative fuels in the United States to date. 

Lessons Learned in the Deployment of Alternative Fueled Vehicles... 

The United States (U.S.) is in the process of embracing the hydrogen powered fuel cell vehicle as the answer to the nation s transportation needs, at least for the second half of the twenty-first century, and perhaps before then as well. The scientific, engineering, social, consumer acceptance, economic, and policy hurdles that must be overcome to enable this technology to succeed are unprecedented. This chapter analyzes past deployments of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) by DaimlerChrysler Corporation to reveal the lessons learned so that potential stumbling blocks or inconsistent policies can be avoided in the deployment of hydrogen powered cars and light duty trucks. 

One key lesson learned by Chrysler over the past decade is that any AFV program needs to be an integral part of a clearly articulated and broadly accepted national energy policy with explicit goals. The goals should delineate with some precision the problem that is to be tackled, whether it is C02 emissions, fossil fuel use, or dependence on imported petroleum. It must be recognized that the goals adopted will determine the relevant solution sets and may preclude some politically popular alternatives. 

Understanding the Transition to New Fuels and Vehicles Lessons Learned from Analysis and Experience of Alternative Fuel and Hybrid Vehicles... 

It is recognized that there are three major points of lessons learned from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. The first point is the enhancement of systems that may be needed to decrease the likelihood of a severe accident due to extreme external hazards. Namely, robustness should be enhanced in power supphes [direct current and alternating current (AC), if needed to power an active safety system], cooling functions (core, CV, and spent fuel pools), and the heat transportation system, including the final heat sink. The second point is the enhancement of response measures against severe accidents. The means should be provided to prevent severe mechanical loads on CVs and the instrumentation should be prepared to identify the status of the reactor core and the CV. The third point is the reinforcement of safety infirastructure by ensuring the independency and diversity of safety systems. These points are incorporated into SDC taking the characteristics of SFRs into account (Kamide et al., 2015). 

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