Reactors failure

Reactors should not dissolve in the reaction medium. Judging by spectro-graphic analysis of spent catalysts, some attack of the reactor is more common than is generally supposed. It may be a cause of catalyst failure. Reactors are commonly made of type 316 stainless steel, but other alloys may provide better resistance to spedhc corrosive agents. 

Condition II faults, at worst, result in a reactor trip with the plant being capable of returning to operation. Condition II events are not expected to result in fuel rod failures, reactor coolant system failures, or secondary system over-pressurisation. 

Figure 11 shows a system for controlling the water dow to a chemical reactor. The dow is measured by a differential pressure (DP) device. The controller decides on an appropriate control strategy and the control valve manipulates the dow of coolant. The procedure to determine the overall failure rate, the failure probabiUty, and the reUabiUty of the system, assuming a one-year operating period, is outlined hereia. 

The development of computer capabiUties in hardware and software, related instmmentation and control, and telecommunication technology represent an opportunity for improvement in safety (see COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY). Plant operators can be provided with a variety of user-friendly diagnostic aids to assist in plant operations and incipient failure detection. Communications can be more rapid and dependable. The safety control systems can be made even more rehable and maintenance-free. Moreover, passive safety features to provide emergency cooling for both the reactor system and the containment building are being developed. 

Concrete nuclear reactor vessels, of the order of magnitude of 15-m (50-ft) inside diameter and length, have inner linings of steel which confine the pressure. After fabrication of the liner, the tubes for the cables or wires are put in place and the concrete is poured. High-strength reinforcing steel is used. Because there are thousands of reinforcing tendons in the concrete vessel, there is a statistical factor of safety. The failure of 1 or even 10 tendons would have little effec t on the overall structure. 

High reactor temperature due to failure of temperature control. Temperature excursion outside the safe operating envelope. 

Low ambient tern- Monitor temperature perature resulting. adequate heating in embrittlement and/or mechanical design system to accommodate minimum failure of reactor. expected temperature Provide freeze protection/heat tracing CCPS G-23 CCPS G-29 Lees 1996... 

Errors of omission involve failure to do something. For example, failure to clean out the reactor before charging. 

But w hen the third and/or second harmonics are also present in the system, at a certain fault level it is possible that there may occur a parallel resonanee between the capacitor circuit and the inductance of the system (source), resulting in very heavy third or second harmonic resonant currents, which may cause failure of the series reactor as well as the capacitors. In such cases, a 6% reactor will not be relevant and a harmonic analysis will be mandatory to provide more exacting filter circuits. 

High pressure reactions High inventories of stored pressure (e.g. in pressurized reactors or associated plant) can result in catastrophic failure of the pressure shell... 

It is generally desirable to minimize the diameter of a tubular reactor, because the leak rate in case of a tube failure is proportional to its cross-sectional area. For exothermic reactions, heat transfer will also be more efficient with a smaller tubular reactor. However, these advantages must be balanced against the higher pressure drop due to flow through smaller reactor tubes. 

The Reactor Safety Study extensively used the lognormal distribution (equation 2.5-6) to represent the variability in failure rates. If plotted on logarithmic graph paper, the lopnormal distribution is normally distributed. 

LOCA, is presented in Table 3.4.5-1. In preparing the event tree, reference to the reactor s design determines the effect of the failure of the various systems. Following the pipe break, the system should scram (Figure 3.4.5-2, node 1). If scram is successful, the line following the node goes up. Successful initial steam condensation (node 2 up) protects the containment from initial overpressure. Continuing success in these events traverses the upper line of the event tree to state 1 core cooled. Any failures cause a traversal of other paths in the evL-nl tree. 

Humans control all chemical and nuclear processes, and to some extent all accidents result from human error, if not directly in the accident then in the process design and in the process inadequate design to prevent human error. Some automatic systems such used in nuclear power reactors because the response time required is too short for human decisions. Even in these, human error can contribute to failure by inhibiting the systems. 

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