Design-basis threats

Kovchegin, Dmitrii, Approaches to Design Basis Threat in Russia in the Context of Significant Increase of Terrorist Activity, thesis. Harvard University, 2002. 

The final result of this step is a set of design basis threat statements that you can use to develop attack scenarios in the next step. Some examples are... 

Attack Scenarios. In this step, you put together the information obtained in the previous three steps to establish scenarios for potential terrorist attacks using the design basis threats against your assets to produce adverse consequences. For example, you might identify that a terrorist could drive a VBIED close enough to an anhydrous ammonia storage tank that upon detonation, the tank will collapse and release ammonia, with resultant impact on the nearby population. 

The physical security system provides physical features to detect, delay, assist response to, and defend against the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage. The physical security system consists of physical barriers and an intrusion detection system. The details of the physical security system are protected information. The physical security system provides protection for vital equipment and plant persormel. 

Criterion 6. Design for a nuclear power plant Should minimize contamination of the facility. Reliance on passive systems or inherent features to perform fundamental safety functions should be emphasized. Design-basis threats (DBTs) should be included in the scope. 

The results of the analysis of design basis accidents with inadvertent reactivity addition and heat removal failure show that the emergency processes evolve without posing a threat to reliability of heat removal from the core. 

The APIOOO design basis is that where possible the threat from internal hazards to prevent safe shutdown has been designed out and where the APIOOO has potential vulnerabilities to an internal hazard this is tested using the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as described in European DCD Chapter 19 (it should be noted that the DCD uses the terminology of external events for both internal and external hazards on the basis they are external to the plant systems). 

This section should present the results of a detailed evaluation of the effects of potential incidents at present or proposed industrial, transport or other installations in the vicinity of the site. Any identified threats to the plant should be considered for inclusion in the design basis events to help determine any additional design features considered necessary to mitigate the effects of the potential incidents identified. A description of projected developments relating to this information should also be provided and should be updated as required. 

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