Core realizers manifestations

The concern, then, is that functional states and events do not cause their manifestations rather, their core realizers, their bases — to use another term from disposition theory — cause the manifestations. This concern is succinctly expressed by Frank Jackson (1996) in the following passage ... 

Thus, on Humean grounds, he denies that functional events cause their manifestations.Moreover, he points out that if functional properties do not cause their manifestations, then they do not cause anything their core realizers cause by causing their manifestations. ... 

A non-Humean response is to maintain that state and event types have at least some of their causal powers essentially, namely, the (conditional) powers to produce their manifestations. I will not attempt to determine here whether we should be Humeans or non-Humeans about causation. Suffice it for the moment just to note that even if event types endow causal powers essentially, the question remains whether functional state and event types endow causal powers. Thus, suppose that the Humean view is indeed wrong, and that some structures are essentially killer structures, and so essentially endow the power to kill. The question would still remain why the state of having some or other killer structure is a state that is itself a killer state - a state that endows the power to kill — given that it is not identical with any of the killer structures. Why think that the property of having some property or other that essentially endows the power to kill is itself a property that endows the power to kill Similarly, even if all the bases or core realizers of a functional property, water solubility, essentially endow the (conditional) power to cause dissolvings in water, what reason is there to think that the functional property does - that water solubility itself does For the moment, suffice it to note that these questions deserve answers. 

This concern is raised by appeal to the physical bases for the dispositions, but all that matters is that the dispositions have bases, not specifically what their bases are or whether they are physical. The point about fragility would arise even in a world in which its bases all involved spook-glue. As concerns functional states and events, the concern is that for any manifestation, it is invariably the case that the core realizer (on the occasion in question) brings it about, and so there is no work for the functional state or event to do in bringing it about. The concern arises for any effects of the core realizers or bases (physical or not), even ones that are not neither manifestations of the functional events nor caused by means of the causation of their manifestations. 

Before asking why they won t be undercutting, let us first note that Melnyk requires that causation-grounding regularities be contingent, which, of course, is standard for regularity theories. Recall, however, that functional event types have manifestations. Their manifestations are the effect types (perhaps conditional effect types) of their core realizers, effect types to which the functional event types are linked by definition. There will, then, be conditional necessitation relations that functional event types bear to their manifestations. When fully ticketed to accommodate all the relevant contingencies of an actual situation, there will be a metaphysically... 

Consider, for example, a colony of ants. It is perfectly clear that the local mles manifest themselves in the interaction of innumerable individual ants. At the same time, it is equally clear that the whole anthill, on a global level, has an identity of its own. . . We can now ask ourselves where this insect colony is located. Where is it If you stick your hand into the anthill, you will only be able to grasp a number of ants, i.e., the incorporation of local rules. Furthermore, you will realize that a central control unit cannot be localised anywhere because it does not have an independent identity but a relational one. The ants exist as such but their mutual relations produce an emergent entity that is quite real and amenable to direct experience. This mode of existence was unknown before on the one hand, we perceive a compact identity, on the other, we recognize that it has no determinable substance, no localisable core. 

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