Context of justification

The basic strategy in using taxometric procedures is to presume a taxon— for example, depression. Next, we are required to conjecture the presumed taxon s indicators—sadness, anhedonia, and suicidality. Presume and conjecture based on what Clinical experience, intuition, past theory and research. .. it really does not matter. The presuming and conjecturing take place in what Popper (1959) called the context of discovery, where ideas, theories, and hypotheses are developed from any source. The empirical evaluation of these ideas, however, takes place in Popper s context of justification when the question is a taxometric one, the context of justification involves taxometric analyses. 

To clarify this further, let us go back through the depression example but in greater detail. Assume we have a reason to conjecture a depression taxon (again, the reason does not matter this is Popper s [1959] context of discovery, not context of justification). Similarly, assume we have other reasons to conjecture valid indicators of this presumed taxon (sadness, anhe-donia, and suicidality). 

The act of discovery escapes logical analysis there are no logical rules in terms of which a "discovery machine" could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius. But it is not the logician s task to account for scientific discoveries all he can do is to analyze the relation between given facts and a theory presented to him with the claim that it explains these facts. In other words, logic is concerned with the context of justification. 

Positivists he otherwise opposed, Popper used the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification to identify the philosophy of science with the logic of science "... 

Popper used the term logic of discovery to denote the logic of science) by which he meant the (logical) context of justification, not the (psychological) context of discovery. 

The two main questions posed by this stance are of course how we describe such inconsistent structures as part of an overall whole, as well as how science did end up that way. The first one is a descriptive, the latter a generative question. This distinction in descriptive and generative aspects of the problem of inconsistency in science closely mirrors Reichenbach s 1937 distinction between context of discovery and context of justification . We may conclude that as philosophers of science, we have to be capable of dealing with such inconsistent structures from both points of view. 

The resulting description provides the context of the problem (the specification), the context and considerations involved (the justification), and the solution (resulting design). 

Under actual conditions, efficient spending of money and, especially, they investment into the most topical decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation areas are the issues of paramount importance. In this context the problem of justification of priorities, when addressing the complex decommissioning-related challenges, becomes especially acute. 

While the above reasoning provides a justification for the hydrogen fuel cell strategy, it is important to take a dispassionate look at the arguments within the context of policy issues, market drivers, and technological competition. 

New Zealand studies (see Table 7-3). One approach might be to apply the hierarchical analysis directly to the estimated BMDs, although the committee felt it appropriate to apply the analysis to the inverse BMDs instead. One advantage of working with the inverse BMDs is that very large and undefined values are transformed to zero. Working with the inverse BMDs also has some theoretical justification, because in the context of a linear model, the estimated BMD is simply a constant divided by the estimated dose-response slope (see Equation 7-1). 

This report will be relevant to all these fields but will not cover them. Let me explain the second half of this statement. In a broad way one can say that in each case of the phenomena listed above one has an electronic part, a vibrational part and an interaction between these. The Hamiltonian of the formalism can also be broken up into three corresponding terms. We shall devote one section (see 2.4) to the physical origin of the interaction term and the rest will be about vibrations, in the context of their interaction with impurity electrons, but there will be no attempt to delve into the electronic part. This scheme of study was implied in our title which has vibrations as the subject of this report. This approach of ours to the interplay of electronic and vibrational degrees of freedom in impure insulators has a biased tinge and we present now a justification for it. 

Thus far, we have described the time-dependent nature of polymerizing environments both through stochastic [49-51] and lattice [52,53] models capable of addressing this kind of dynamics in a complex environment. The current article focuses on the former approach, but now rephrases the earlier justification of the use of the irreversible Langevin equation, iGLE, to the polymerization problem in the context of kinetic models, and specifically the chemical stochastic equation. The nonstationarity in the solvent response due to the collective polymerization of the dense solvent now appears naturally. This leads to a clear recipe for the construction of the requisite terms in the iGLE. Namely the potential of mean force and the friction kernel as described in Section 3. With these tools in hand, the iGLE is used... 

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