Columbia Space Shuttle disaster

If a safety professional undertakes to improve the quality of incident investigation, I propose that the following comments about incident investigation as excerpted from the August 2003 Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board be kept in mind as a base for reflection throughout the endeavor. The Report pertains to the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster. It is accessed at http //caib.nasa. go v/news/press releases/pr031028.html) ... 

For hazard and associated risk issues and problems, the regular chain of command may not respond fast enough to respond to the critical nature of the issue. Historical examples of these issues are the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters. An open door policy and procedures that allow unresolved high hazard and risk information to move rapidly to senior leadership should be in place. Essentially, a way to short circuit and bypass normal communication channels is needed. Refer to Chapter 9, Risk Perception—Defining How to Identify Personal Responsibility . 

The importance of a safety culture cannot be understated. Safety culture has been identified as a contributory factor in many catastrophic incidents occurring within the hazardous industries in recent times, including the Ladbroke Grove and Southall rail crashes, Texas BP refinery explosion, the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, and the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster (Hendershot, 2007). 

Our understanding of how the events preceding a disaster unfold has been greatly expanded in the last 20 years by the careful examination of a number of high profile accidents (Boxes 7.1 and 7.2). The brief summaries of major accidents, and the account of the Columbia Space Shuttle accident, allow us to reflect on the many ways in which failure can occur and the complexity of the story that may unfold during a serious investigation. Human beings have the opportunity to contribute to an accident at many different points in the... 

Hydrogen mixed with oxygen triggers another notoriously explosive gas-phase reaction that most probably contributed to the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia as well as the Hindenburg disaster. Gas-phase explosions usually react via chain reactions the electron in a radical finds a mate, but in the process steals an electron from another pair, which creates at least one other radical and possibly more, if a bond is disrupted. 

Ocasio, W. (2005) The opacity of risk Language and the culture of safely in NASA s space shuttle program , in W. H. Starbuck and M. Farjoun (eds.) Organization at the Limit Lessons from the Columbia Disaster. Blackwell Malden, p. 103-115. 

Since the space shuttle returned to flight after the Columbia disaster in 2003, such diagnostics are performed using ground-based telescope cameras or from chase planes during the upper portions of the liftoff and during orbital passes in order to alert mission controllers if repairs are needed in orbit. 

On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated in a disaster that killed its crew. When Columbia began its descent, only a handful of NASA engineers were worried that the shuttle and its crew might be in danger. Minutes later, a routine scientific mission became a nonroutine disaster. 

The new vision, the related policy, and the technological decisions negotiated and drafted in the 1970-2 period placed the space shuttle program on a long-term trajectory that culminated in the Columbia disaster and will continue to affect NASA for years... 

O Keefe shifts money from the space iaunch initiative to the space shuttle and ISS programs. Cancelled safety upgrades. STS-107 - Columbia disaster. Findings of other accidents waiting to happen. ... 

Is it time to rethink the manned space program Despite the Columbia, Challenger, and Apollo disasters, NASA has called for the shuttle program to continue. President Bush s January 2004 initiative for a moon base and manned flights to Mars has led to much discussion about cost, safety, and priorities. 

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