Biological Toxin Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, http //projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-rruiinpage.html the Chemical Weapons Convention, http //www.opcw.nl/. 

This chapter examines the prohibitions in the relevant treaties - the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention - and concludes that chemical weapons are totally prohibited. Consideration is given to the risk of use of chemical weapons posed in the 21st Century, both by states and by other organizations and individuals, such as terrorists, and to how these risks can be countered by the effective implementation of the treaties. 

As of February 2005, there are 134 States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In addition, many of the States Parties, which entered reservations, have lifted those reservations as they are incompatible with the obligations under the later Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there have been successive UnitedNations General Assembly resolutions on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, such as that adopted in October 2004 which include language that ... 

The maintenance of such reservations today are incompatible with the obligations that many of these States Parties have entered into as States Parties to the later treaties - notably the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention and it is for that reason that the successive UN General Assembly... 

A draft convention was submitted by the UK in 1969 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and this gained support from first the USA and then from the Soviet Union. It is, however, evident that its content was considerably diluted in a bilateral negotiations between the USA and the Soviet Union who, consciously or unconsciously, gutted the draft treaty of some of its more important components (Sims, 2001). Nevertheless, this led to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force three years later on 26 March 1975. 

Unfortunately, no Final Declaration was agreed by the 2001-2002 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and consequently the opportunity for such a consensus statement was missed. 

The biological weapons (BW) prohibition regime is built around the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the Australia Group, which expanded its activities from CW-related dual-use goods and technologies into the BW realm in 1990. 

Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which stated ... 

Bioregulators the Emerging Scientific and Technological Issues Relating to Verification and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.29 This monograph was circulated to all states parties at the Review Conference. The issue of peptide bioregulators was also covered in some detail by the United States ... 

J. Rissanen, Chair releases his "composite text" for verification protocol, in Disarmament Diplomacy, 55, London Acronym Institute, March 2001. See also the assessment given by G. S. Pearson, M. R. Dando and N. A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text an Effective Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Evaluation Paper No.21 (Bradford University of Bradford, July 2001). 

On the latter see M. Wheelis, Investigating disease outbreaks under a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in Emerging Infectious Diseases, 6 (6), 2000, 595-600. 

Royal Society, Royal Society Submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Policy Document 25/02 (London Royal Society, 2002). 

DaSilva E. J., Biological warfare, bioterrorism, biodefence and the biological and toxin weapons convention Electronic, Journal of Biotechnology, 2(3), 99-129, 1999. 

Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford (2008) The biological and toxin weapons convention website, http //www.opbw.org/ Accessed 30 June 2008. 

See, for instance. Article Vtll, para 22 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). For the CWC, with its supervisory organization the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the review conference mechanism is embedded in the powers and functions of the OPCW, namely in the role of the plenary body, the Conference of States Parties. Treaties without such supervisory bodies will be reviewed by the States Parties, see Article Xll of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). 

Certain types of weapons have been considered so horrendous that their use has been proscribed by international law. Important examples of such restrictions include the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972), the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) and the recent Convention on Cluster Munitions (2010). These conventions have made valuable contributions to the protection of life. However, they also have limitations. For example, major producers and users of cluster munitions, including Israel, Russia and the United States, have not signed the CCM. Furthermore, there are always temptations to find ways around such legislation or to develop entirely new types of weapons. Two of the many such possibilities will be noted here the use of drugs as weapons and the use of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles). 

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction-. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). 

Advocates of the treaty forecast that an immense array of benefits would flow from an international agreement in Geneva. They contended that a treaty would bolster the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, establish legal norms against the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and retention of chemical weapons. 

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