Amphibious warfare

Speller, Ian, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945—1956, Basingstoke Palgrave, 2001. 

The Navy fleet consists of various surface ship battle forces, including 11 aircraft carriers, 106 surface combatants (i.e., cruisers, destroyers and frigates), 39 amphibious warfare ships, 34 combatant logistic ships, and 31 support/mine warfare ships (total of 221 ships). 

In USA, SCRIMP fabricated large RP products such as a transportation bus weighs about 10,000 kg (22,000 lb) that is 3200 kg (7000 lb) lighter than steel units are. It fabricates a trial 75 ft high integrated mast structure for an amphibious warfare vessel. The RP structure, made up of infused panels, encloses and supports the forest of antennas visible on a normal warship, in a weatherproof, electro-magnetically tuned mast/ housing. 

Although amphibious operations had long been a feature of British warfare, lack of co-operation between the army and navy in the Edwardian period meant that Britain was not well prepared to exploit sea power in this way in the First World War, as was demonstrated at... 

Gallipoli. Matters were no more advanced by the Norwegian campaign in 1940. However, amphibious operations became a major feature of the Second World War and investment in commando carriers and specialist landing craft after 1957 for the East of Suez role raised British capability for combined operations to new levels of efficiency. Once more there is no clear trend here from a naval to an air or nuclear phase in the British way of warfare. 

The Soviet Navy could also assume the offensive and impose a chemical warfare environment in naval engagements. Almost all their tactical weapons, whether air-to-surface or surface-to-surface missiles could carry chemical munitions. Indeed, chemical attacks could prove particularly effective in the context of amphibious operations, not merely against the amphibious forces but also against the supporting naval forces. Soviet weapon systems have the range to implement such attacks, and the stocking of chemicals near the piers and storage places lends credibility to the belief that they have a capability to mount chemical attacks at sea. ... 

I learned the brutality of conventional warfare in the Ardennes. I understand the military calculations that must have anticipated an Allied amphibious assault on Japan, the estimates of tens of thousands of American casualties. Many of my medical school classmates were poised at advance bases in Okinawa, the Philippines, and Iwo Jima for the invasion of Japan. They and their families received news of the bomb and the ensuing peace with a sense of unqualified relief. 

As the combat period approached, Colonel Unmacht and his stafiF turned their attention from numerous projects in gas warfare defense and decontamination to the nontoxic chemical weapons and munitions. Their work on the flame thrower tank, and later on stabilized flame thrower fuels, was the outstanding overseas development work of the worldwide CWS. Unmacht was a strong proponent of the use of the 4.2-inch chemical mortar with high-explosive shell, and the development, testing, and combat supply of a landing craft mortar mounting for Pacific amphibious operations represented one of his achievements in the field of combat support. The mortar gun boat development was also a noteworthy example of Army-Navy co-operation. 

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