Why the First Two Cleanups Failed

Subsequently, on April 2, 1996, another live incendiary white phosphorous shell was reported. The District of Columbia was told that this shell was found in the backyard and kept as a souvenir by the owner inside the house on the fireplace hearth. Although this munition would not have killed as many people as a poison gas shell, it could have quickly burned down the house and occupants because white phosphorus burns when exposed to air. 

In addition, the contractor was never told that arsenicals were tested in open air bursts, which was readily apparent from the records. Hence, there was no effort to establish a wind drift plume of arsenic. Thus, even 

Only a few of these chemicals were tested at the site, and then only at 53 separate locations. No random grid sampling of soil and groundwater was done. No survey has been conducted to determine if there are any adverse health effects to the residents of the area. 

The District of Columbia undertook this study because of three important observations. First, the contaminants potentially present were not industrial chemicals but were expressly designed to kiU people. Second, the containers unearthed to date are shell casings— which are thicker than the drums and cans usually associated with toxic waste dumps—or bottles, increasing the likelihood of lethal concentrations. Third, there was open air testing, which likely left behind metal contamination such as arsenic. There is mounting evidence that the Spring Valley site encompassed a massive production facihty for poison gas in addition to its development and experimentation functions. 

The District of Columbia s research further found that. 

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