Truth Within a Conceptual Scheme

Even though this will be dealt with in more detail later, it is important to get clear about the nature of the ontological mind-dependence of the quasi-phenomenal world. It means only the mind-dependence of things, not the mind-dependence of the relations obtaining between them, which was mentioned in clause (3) of the correspondence theory in the previous paragraph. Take the sentence The table is brown . It is true if and only if the table is brown. The object the table refers to must have the property brown refers to. The object and the property are ontologically mind-dependent. But it is ontologically independent of the mind whether that object does actually have that property. 

This is important, because it is in virtue of this that the Tarskian mechanism yields truth conditions which may go beyond verification conditions. Let us see an example of how this happens. Suppose a physicist derives from his theory that a certain elementary particle p has a certain property Q. Suppose further that the justification condition which fixes the reference of includes the description of an elaborate experimental set-up. Suppose that the reference-fixing justification condition for g includes the description of a completely different sort of 

This was merely the first step in developing an account of truth, hi this section and the following one the account will be further elaborated through the consideration of a number of objections. Some of the objections will be similar to the ones raised in connection with the notion of reference and will be dealt similarly. Some will be brand new. I will first discuss two relatively simple objections, and then move to the deep and dangerous waters. 

More importantly, someone might worry that my account is either incoherent or circular. It may seem incoherent because it uses two different notions of truth. And if the two are not really different, it may be circular. These twin objections rely on the procedure I used. The procedure I followed comprises altogether four steps. The three steps described in 3.1., and the step taken right now. 

Step 1 Select the sentence or sentences which fix the reference of the word. 

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This completes our account of truth within a conceptual scheme. I tried to show that this account does not threaten the objectivity of truth, and also reconciles the reference-based Tarskian notion of truth with modest verificationism. Nonetheless, in the course of the discussion I talked quite freely about adequate and inadequate conceptual schemes, as I did in the previous chapter. So now I have to explain what it is for a conceptual scheme to be adequate. 

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