The Myths of Safety

Assumptions sometimes become so entrenched that they turn into myths. Whereas an assumption is something that is taken for granted without proof, a myth is a belief that has become an integral part of a world view. Assumptions that are sustained for a long time can turn into myths, but by the time this happens the assumptions are probably no longer valid. Assumptions are sometimes questioned - if we have the time and resources to do it - but myths are never questioned, not even if we have the time or resources to do so. 

Safety-I embodies a number of assumptions and myths and thereby indirectly endorses them. Since these are important determinants of how we perceive adverse outcomes, how we try to understand them and how we respond to them - and, thereby, how we manage safety - it is worthwhile to consider some of the most important ones in more detail. 

The most important of the myths of Safety-I is the unspoken assumption that outcomes can be understood as effects that follow 

Since adverse outcomes have causes, it must be possible to find these causes provided enough evidence is collected. Once the causes have been found, they can be eliminated, encapsulated, or otherwise neutralised. Doing so will reduce the number of things that go wrong, and hence improve safety. 

Since all adverse outcomes have a cause (or causes) and since all causes can be found, it follows that all accidents can be prevented. This is the vision of zero accidents or zero harm that many companies covet. 

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There is also an addendum to the second assumption, that has been mentioned in the discussion of the myths of Safety-1. This is the notion that there must be a kind of congruence or proportionality between causes and effects. If the effects are minor or trivial - a slight incident or a near miss - then we tacitly assume that the cause also is minor. Conversely, if the effects are major - such as a serious accident or disaster - then we expect that the causes somehow match that, or at least that they are not trivial. (A consequence of that is the assumption that the more serious an event is, the more we can learn from it this is discussed further in Chapter 8.) In both cases the assumption about proportionality may clearly bias the search for causes, so that we look either for something trivial or something significant. 

One of the comforts of the causality credo, combined with the myths of Safety-I, is that it becomes easy to find simple - and sometimes oversimplified - explanations for things that have gone wrong. This convenience seems to be lost with the emphasis on performance adjustments and performance variability as a basis for Safety-II. 

Reviewing Heinrich Dislodging Two Myths from the Practice of Safety This chapter examines two myths that should be dislodged from the practice of safety. They arise from the work of H. W. Heinrich and can be found in the four editions of Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach. The myths are ... 

It has not been possible to locate a body of research that supports the validity of either the Heinrich or the Bird and Loftus postulations. They are mythical. Yet, safety professionals continue to offer them as truths. (For further discussion on the Heinrichean myths, see Chapter 10, Reviewing Heinrich Dislodging Two Myths from the Practice of Safety ). 

An article titled Reviewing Heinrich Dislodging Two Myths from the Practice of Safety was published in the October 2011 issue of Professional Safety by Manuele. One of the letters to the editor about that article was written by Dr. E. Scatt Geller. It was published in the... 

Manuele, Fred A. Reviewing Heinrich Dislodging Two Myths from the Practice of Safety. Professional Safety, October 2011. 

REVIEWING HEINRICH DISLODGING TWO MYTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF SAFETY... 

The data collection and analytical methods used by Heinrich to develop the 88-10-2 ratios are unsupportable. Heinrich s premise that unsafe acts are the primary causes of occupational accidents cannot be sustained. The myth represented by those ratios must be dislodged from the practice of safety and actively refuted by safety professionals. 

One of Heinrich s premises is that The natural conclusion follows, moreover, that in the largest injury group. The minor injuries lie the most valuable clues to accident causes. (P31-3 edition, P33 edition). Heinrich s premise is wrong. This is a myth that must be dislodged from the practice of safety. 

The intent of this chapter is to present a review of the origin of certain premises that have been accepted as truisms by many educators and safety practitioners, how they evolved and changed over time, and to examine their validity. Beyond doubt the two premises discussed here are wrongly based and cannot be sustained by safety practitioners. The premises themselves and the methods used to establish them cannot withstand a logic test. They are myths that have become deeply imbedded in the practice of safety, and it is the responsibility of safety professionals to take action to have them dislodged. 

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