The Air a River of Opaque Filth

In the juggernaut of war, chemical weapons were seen as holding a particularly terrible place. The number of gas casualties in the First World War was enormous - estimated by the US government at 1300 000 of whom some 90000 died. Reliable casualty figures, however, are hard to come by. Claims and counter-claims made for propaganda purposes distorted the earliest figures and accurate records of gas casualties were not always kept.  

There are many detailed accounts of the use of gas in the First World War a number are contemporary or nearly so, and include books by men who had been closely involved in gas warfare C.H. Foulkes, who had charge of the British Special Brigade S.J.M. Auld Amos Fries of the US Gas Service. Of more modern accounts. The first volume of the SIPRI study. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, contains much material, as does L.F. Haber s excellent book based on the papers of the late Harold Hartley (one of the first Chemical Advisers appointed to the British Armies in 

France, and later head of the anti-gas organisation within the Directorate of Gas Services)7 Readers wishing for a full account of the use of gas in the First World War should consult these studies. My purpose is to consider what the experience of the First World War reveals about the military uses and utility of chemical weapons, and how that experience has shaped subsequent perceptions of chemical warfare. 

The possibility that these developments would lead to chemical warfare on a significant scale was recognised, and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating gases (see chapter 8 for further material on the control of chemical weapons.) 

The German Supreme Command did not seemingly expect much from the trial they refused a request from the XV Corps (which was to use the gas) for extra ammunition to exploit and consolidate any success, and no reserves were allotted to the Ypres sectors.The Supreme Command s aim was apparently to weaken resistance before an infantry assault and to delay the movement of supplies and reinforcements. The objective of the attack was limited operational orders described it as the seizure of the ridge marked by the road Boesinghe-Pilckem-Langemarck-Poelcappelle. After the objective is reached the troops are at once to dig in. . 

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