Roer River Bridge Behind a Smoke Screen

Roer River Bridge Behind a Smoke Screen 

The VII Corps, spearheading the First Army s advance to the Rhine, eliminated all enemy resistance in its zone on the west side of the river by 9 March. On the following day the 87th Battalion received word that it was to be sent from the First to the Seventh Army, which on 15 March was to initiate a drive through the imporant Saar-Palatinate triangle. This operation was to involve the penetration of the Sieg- 

Companies A and B consolidated their fire in support of the 7th Infantry. Between oaoo and 0315 on 26 March they fired twenty-three concentrations entailing 1,200 rounds of ammunition. Thereafter various targets of opportunity—machine guns, self-propelled guns, mortars— were hit by the 4.2-inch mortars. At dawn the combined companies laid two lo-hour screens (600 and 2,200 yards) which concealed bridge-building operations from direct enemy observation. Companies A and B expended 3,615 rounds of WP and 462 rounds of HE during the first day of the attack. The effectiveness of the fire was made a matter of record by the operations oflScer of the 3d Division. 

The Ninth Army, north of First Army and still under control of 21 Army Group, crossed the Rhine in an area just north of the Ruhr Valley. The army attack was concentrated on the XVI Corps front, with another corps poised to exploit initial successes, and a third lending support by fire and demonstration. In keeping with the decision temporarily to bypass the great Ruhr industrial area, XVI Corps attacked with an exposed right flank. To prevent enemy observation from the many potential observation posts in the Ruhr Valley, Ninth Army called for a 2-mile smoke screen along its exposed right flank. 

Artificial Haze Obscures Vehicles Crossing The Rhine 

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