Professional Safety causation models

If several safety professionals investigate a given hazards-related incident, they should identify the same causal factors, with minimum variation. That is unlikely if the thought processes they use have greatly different foundations. At least 25 causation models have been published. Since many of them conflict, all of them cannot be valid. A review of some of them is followed by a discussion of principles that should be contained in a causation model. 

This chapter addresses the need for safety professionals to adopt an incident causation model, a thought process based on a sound understanding of the hazards-related incident phenomenon and which, when applied, identifies the reality of the causal factors in the incident process. 

PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PRACTICE REQUIRES ESTABLISHING AN ACCEPTED CAUSATION MODEL... 

Dr. Roger L. Brauer, Executive Director of the Board of Certified Safety Professionals, made the following comment about proving the validity of causation models ... 

Safety professionals apply differing and contradictory incident causation models, and the work of some of them is misdirected and ineffective. Professional safety practice requires that the advice given to avoid, eliminate, or control hazards be based on a sound incident causation model, a thought process, so that, through the application of that model, the desired risk reduction is attained. That will not occur if the causation model used does not require identifying the actual causal factors. 

If we who call ourselves safety professionals are to be tmly perceived as professionals, we must resolve this matter of a generally accepted hazards-related incident causation model. A major study on this subject would be to our advantage. 

Safety professionals give many names to the incidents to which a causation model would apply accidents, incidents, mishaps, near-misses, occurrences, events, illnesses, fires, explosions, windstorms, drownings, electrocutions, and so on. Pat Clemens, a prominent safety consultant, has said that the language used by safety practitioners lacks words to convey precise and understood meanings. It s probable that the people with whom safety professionals try to eommunicate are baffled by the many terms used to describe hazards-related incidents. 

It s proposed that safety professionals can benefit from a review of the causation models on which their practices are based. For those who would undertake such an exercise toward the development of an acceptable causation model for hazards-related incidents, the following are recommended as noinimal readings ... 

And just what observations can be made from all this If safety professionals choose to examine their causation models, which are the basis of the advice they give, this thought process is proposed for consideration, as a beginning ... 

Professional safety practice requires that the advice given be based on a sound hazards-related incident causation model so that, through the application of that advice, hazards are effectively avoided, eliminated, or controlled and risks are reduced. 

It is a necessity that the advice given by safety professionals be based on an understanding of the reality of causal factors and actually serves to attain a state for which the risks are judged to be acceptable. I will develop a systemic causation model for hazards-related occupational incidents that represents the thoughts set forth in this chapter. 

DeJoy, David M. Toward a Comprehensive Human Factors Model of Workplace Accident Causation. Professional Safety, May 1990. 

McCIay, Robert E. Toward a More Universal Model of Loss Incident Causation. Professional Safety, January and February, 1989. 

Dejoy, D.M. (1990). Towards a Comprehensive Human Factors Model of Woikplace Accident Causation Professional Safety, 35(5), 11-16. 

Systemic Socio-Technical Causation Model for Hazards-Related Incidents At least 25 incident causation models are referenced in safety literature. They present a great diversity of thinking. None of those models have achieved anything close to universal acceptance. Yet, safety professionals are obligated to have the advice they give be effective as clients take action to avoid, eliminate, or control hazards and to achieve acceptable risk levels. That advice must be based on a sound and studied thought process that takes into consideration the reality of the sources of hazards. This author builds a case in support of what he proposes for a systemic sociotechnical causation model for hazards-related incidents. 

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