Processing equipment, viii

Systematic failure normally occurs on account of design failure, including incorrect specifications, using a component not fit for the operation, and or due to error in software. Safety life cycle is adapted for systematic faults. So safety standards meant for E/E/PEs take care of both. SISs (Ref. Chapter VII) are developed to prevent or mitigate hazardous events to protect people or the environment, or prevent damage to process equipment. In this connection another important issue is SIL (Chapter VIII), which is a discrete level for specifying the safety integrity requirements of safety functions, but is not a measure of risk. SIL provides means for risk reduction to a tolerable level. The fundamental question, in case of functionally safe instrumentation, is how frequently failures of function will lead to accidents. The answers can be ... 

The placement of detectors should be determined following the advice of experts having sound knowledge of both gas dispersion and process/equipment and safety. All the agreed locations must be recorded. Obviously, detectors shall be located where the gas is most likely to be present. In this instance. Clause 3.6 of Chapter VIII may be referred to. Major issues in this regard shall include but not be limited to the following ... 

Tables VII and VIII sumnarize present and future RIM engineering plastic developments. This is an emerging area for RIM processable materials part of which will be made possible by recent equipment developments such as hot RIM. Polyurethane materials which now exist in this hard segment range are plastics...

Corrosion monitoring must be coupled with diagnostic work and remedial action. In some cases of corrosion, remedial action may be obvious or easily deduced. In other cases, diagnostic work precedes a decision or remedial action. The options for remedying corrosion problems in a process plant are (i) install a CP system (ii) install an anodic protection system (iii) change equipment design (iv) improve feed stock purity (v) alter process variables (vi) change the alloy/material (vii) institute inhibitor additions (viii) institute planned maintenance. 

Lead in Construction—1926.62(i)(1)(i) through (iv) (2)(i) through (viii) and (3)(i) and (ii) Process Safety Management of Highiy Hazardous Chemicais—1926.64 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response—1926.65 Subpart E Personai Protective and Life Saving Equipment... 

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