Obvious failures

Flexibility The normal anodic film begins to crack if subjected to an extension exceeding about 0 - 5%. Thinner films up to 5 nm in thickness appear to withstand a greater degree of deformation without obvious failure, and are often used for dyed coatings on continuously anodised strip from which... 

Hydraulic (Liquid Seal) Flame Arresters Hydraulic (liquid seal) flame arresters are most commonly used in large-pipe-diameter systems where fixed-element flame arresters are either cost-prohibitive or otherwise impractical (e.g., very corrosive gas or where the gas contains solid particles that would quickly plug a conventional arrester element). These arresters contain a liquid, usually water-based, to provide a flame barrier. Figure 23-62 shows one design. Realistic tests are needed to ensure performance, as described in EN 12874 [15]. Note that hydraulic flame arresters may fail at high flow rates, producing a sufficiently high concentration of gas bubbles to allow transmission of flame. This is distinct from the more obvious failure mode caused by failure to maintain adequate liquid level. 

A rate factor approach to chemical reactivity assumes that structural effects influence rate constants in an additive way. While this assumption enjoys considerable success, an obvious failure arises when dealing with steric effects. Naturally, agreement between calculated and observed results is best when the reaction conditions applied to a new substrate are similar to those used on model compounds to obtain rate factors. 

Two caveats will help to make this point clear one is the obvious failure of many, or even most, of our emotionally salient experiences to trigger dreams. As far as we know, and our knowledge is admittedly limited, there are many salient people, events, and impulses that we never dream about at all. 

After identification of a root cause, it is important to determine whether any assay runs besides the obvious failures may be affected. Depending on the investigation outcome, validity of these assays should be reassessed and the outcome documented well. 

It should be noted that in the context of these experiments, a stable detonation is defined as one in which the detonation wave completes its run through the two-phase mixture without an obvious failure and asymptotically approaches a stationary state. Significant fluctuation about the mean velocity is to be expected (as it would be for a poorly mixed gas-phase detonation). A detonation... 

State 1 belongs to a dangerous and for validation algorithm obvious failure. Its failure rate will be k i. 

To obtain complete list of states for each logical evaluating algorithm it is needful to set tablet of all possible states of each individual channel, recording to division of failures on latent/obvious and danger-ous/safe. For five possible states and three individual channels we obtain tablet of 125 rows, each independent to another, which is impossible to be shown at this place. Following tablet shows only these terms, which contain obvious failures. So we have three inputs, each can reach to three states and the tablet will be reduced to only 27 independent rows. 

If we need to decide about profitability of algorithm, we have to know at least approximate values of failure rates and repair rates (in both cases - latent and obvious failure). If we want to reason about latent and obvious failures (meaning for verification algorithm), we have to vary rate between frequencies of... 

Figure 2. Graph of unavailability dependence on ratio between failure rates of latent and obvious failures.

As shown in Figure 16, the deformation of rock mass is influenced by the faults, dislocation of deformation and stress concentration are happened in the faults zone. The deformation behaviors of large imderground cavern under high in-situ stresses is influenced by the fault very obvious. Failure of imderground cavern will be more easily happened in the fault zone and the nearby rock masses (as shown in Fig. 17). 

Experience has shown that our best efforts to predict potential problem areas frequently miss the fatal flaws. For this reason it is advisable to perform at least one broad, severe corrosive gas test and one similarly harsh particle test, even if no obvious failure scenario can be envisioned that would be expected to be manifested through these tests. It is also helpful to stress the material or product sufficiently to produce significant corrosion or malfunction, even if this requires unrealistically harsh conditions. Such a test helps ensure that the designer understands the materials limitations and may indicate that the product is over-designed. Less resistant, less expensive materials may be sufficient for the intended use. 

The first job of a roof is to keep precipitation out. If water is coming in, blame it on the roof Head up to the attic to look for spots where the structure of the roof deck sags inward and, on a rainy day, look for leaks. On a sunny day, check for places where l ht shines through. Beyond these obvious failures, look from the attic at the underside of the roof deck for dark spots and black streaks that can indicate the locations of slower leaks. Mildew can also be a sign that moisture is making its way past the roof... 

It is useful to express the fragility in terms of a random variable representing the capacity, denoted by /I, and defined in terms of the same ground motion parameter used for the fragility definition. Obviously, failure occurs if the capacity is lower than the peak ground acceleration of the assumed seismic event. The definition of the fragility can then be extended as follows ... 

Obviously, failures to attend to probabihties and chance have serious implications for risk assessment and management. A substantial challenge to our management in this realm comes when we substitute our sense of understanding based upon small samples and unreasonable comparisons for events that we do not fully understand. 

These are a derivative of active/passive failure conditions, but with a novel twist brought in during the introduction of digital technology. Many computer-based information systems act in an advisory maimer, where an obvious failure can be tolerated but a plausible but wrong output is hazardous. 

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