Nuclear smuggling

Aloise, Gene, Combating Nuclear Smuggling Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and Other Countries, June 21, 2005, GAO-05-840T. 

Source Ewell, E.S., NIS nuclear smuggling since 1995 a lull in significant cases Nonproliferation Rev. Spring-Summer 1998. With permission. 

Williams, P., and P. N. Woessner, The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling, Scientific American, January 1996. 

According to the report by Bunn (1997), smuggling of sensitive nuclear materials has in fact already occurred. L. Koch of the European Commission s Joint Research Centre that analyses material from nuclear smuggling cases says that some involved weapon material or weapon-usable material. Indeed, there have been multiple seizures by authorities in Russia and elsewhere of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable material, mostly highly enriched uranium. 

However, the limitations— mainly political and not scientific or technical— should also be kept in mind, as discussed in detail (Weitz 2011). Some of the points raised are quoted in Frame 5.2. The understandable reluctance of countries with advanced nuclear technologies to expose and share the details of the composition of these materials with other countries, combined with the mutual suspicions that some governments may have about providing samples that may later be used to incriminate them in acts of nuclear smuggling or terrorism, impose severe limitations on the usefulness of databases of nuclear materials. 

If al-Qaida or another terrorist group gained control of one or more Russian suitcase nuclear weapons, they could be smuggled into the U.S. by small boat or overland from Mexico or Canada. The explosion of such a device in a crowded city could cause immediate deaths of tens of thousands and lead to cancer for many of the survivors. 

Pre-det investigations of smuggled nuclear samples at Livermore have been conveniently divided into source and route (or pathway) efforts for optimum information return. Source analyses allow assessments of the identity and quality of the nuclear material, as well as perhaps its origin, production modality, and supply potential. Route analyses are the province of criminalistics examinations and geolocation measurements. They provide insights into the identities of the traffickers, their methods and habits, pathway(s) of the material after legitimate control was lost, frequency of shipment, and potential end-user applications. More detailed discussion of source and route forensic analyses can be found in (Moody et al. 2005). 

A partial list of the tool-kit available for nuclear forensics investigations is shown in Table 5.1 (IAEA 2006). A somewhat different list of the tools that are used to characterize seized nuclear materials (pellets or powder) is shown in Table 5.2 (Wallenius et al. 2006). One more point that is almost unique for nuclear forensics when a smuggled radioactive material is seized or when undeclared nuclear activities are suspected, the law enforcement forces are expected to provide a preliminary characterization of the material within a short time (usually 24 h) and more detailed and accurate data after a few more days, as shown in Table 5.3 (IAEA 2006). These publications will be mentioned in context with the subject matter of this chapter. 

NORAD). An air defense command and control center, commonly known as NORAD, operated jointly by Canada and the United States. NORAD is tasked to detect and monitor man-made objects over North America, including in outer space. The facility is hardened against nuclear weapon attack and is deeply buried within Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Colorado. Although it was established primarily to detect possible nuclear attacks and to coordinate an appropriate response, the facility has also been used to assist with the interdiction of narcotics smuggling. 

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