Nuclear reactors radiological consequences

III-4] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors, Regulatory Guide 1.4, NRC, Washington, DC... 

EE-C3 items should be designed, installed and maintained in accordance with engineering practice for nuclear applications. K their acceptance criteria can be explicitly connected with the specific associated radiological consequences (assumed different from the reactor induced consequences), such criteria could be different from (and in general less conservative than) those defined for EE-Cl. 

The safety objectives for research reactors which are vulnerable to external events [16] define the acceptable radiological consequences to workers and the public under accident conditions. Other safety consequences, such as chemical hazards posed by research reactors, do not fall within the scope of this publication according to the relevant criteria for nuclear installations set forth in Refs [1,4]. 

Enhancement of the safety of future plants is pronq>ted by several factors. First is the tendency for industrial activities to become safer and more efficient as they are developed with time. Second is the desire to maintain the current low level of risk to the public from nuclear power, even in the event that the number of nuclear reactors is greatly increased in the future. Third is the desire to limit the likelihood and consequences of severe accidents in future plants. Minimizing the potential for large off-site radiological consequences minimizes the inqiact of NPPs on public healdi and safety, thereby reducing the need for offsite protective actions. Finally, in some countries, enhancement of safety is a prerequisite for public acceptance of a new or increased nuclear power programme. 

WSRC must upgrade these safety analyses to meet commercial nuclear industry standards for similar analyses. Prior to reactor restart, the DOE staff will review the upgraded transient and accident analyses for completeness of analysis of events and consequences, including the conservative consideration of human performance and equipment designed to mitigate the radiological consequences of credible accidents. 

No one knew for certain the radiological conseqnences of a severe reactor accident, bnt hypothetical studies had been carried out. Few in the nuclear industry expected to see an experiment done for real in which the consequences of a severe reactor accident would be measurable. 

---