Net centric

Multi-static radar is usually combined with the net-centric approach to data exchange. All sensor sites have to be connected by high-throughput, self-configuring data links. The data links should also provide a very stable clock to make all processing coherent, and very accurate time data to synchronize all events in the distributed system. 

Towards Net-Centric Cyber Survivability for Ballistic Missile Defense ... 

We expect that adversaries may attempt to employ cyber attacks to interfere with the DoD s SOA systems. For example, an adversary may accompany a ballistic missile attack with a multitude of cyber attacks designed to inhibit defensive missile counter-measures. It is therefore imperative that mission-critical net-centric systems operate dependably, even when under cyber attack. 

We propose a net-centric architecture for augmenting the survivability of critical DoD network services. Our architecture draws inspiration from several theories of warfare, focusing on the goal of giving commanders decision superiority in the cyber domain. Commanders have decision superiority when they are able to make better and quicker decisions than their adversaries [5]. 

We evaluate our architecture in the context of a BMD demonstration. In November 2009, MIT Lincoln Laboratory demonstrated a proof-of-concept net-centric BMD decision-support system during the simulation of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack [10]. For this exercise, we developed and deployed an illustration-of-concept implementation of om siu vivability architecture. This exercise demonstrated the principles of om siu vivability architecture in a realistic simulation of a coordinated ICBM and cyber attack. Our experience developing this survivabihty architecture taught us several important lessons learned, which we share in this paper. 

The design of our survivability architecture draws from several theories of warfare. In particular our design uses concepts from information warfare, net-centric warfare, and decision superiority. In this section we present background material on these concepts and relate them to decision-support systems and cyber survivability. 

Our cyber-survivability architecture is a decision-support system. Our approach diverges from existing approaches by using net-centric services to facilitate human and automated decision making. 

The DoD has adopted the theory of network-centric warfare in its campaign to adapt to warfare in the information age [1]. Net-centricity promises to enhance mission effectiveness based on the following premises ... 

Net-centric forces leverage high-quality information networks to strengthen their OODA loops. By rapidly sharing observations and intelligence, decision makers can make better decisions more quickly—achieving decision superiority. 

Service-oriented architectures (SOAs) facilitate information sharing and collaboration, enabling net-centricity. Accordingly, the DoD is increasingly interested in developing SOA systems to facilitate mission-critical decision-support systems. 

In the next section we outline our net-centric survivability architecture, which we use to augment the survivability of the net-centric BMD system. 

As the DoD intends to use net-centric SOA systems during warfare, we expect these systems to be subject to attack. More importantly than usual, such mission-critical systems must be robust to system faults that result from either innocent error or malicious attacks. 

As defined in Section 2, we believe that engineers should augment the cyber survivability of their systems by using cyber decision-support systems. In this section we describe such systems as they apply to net-centric architecture net-centric cyber decision-support (NCDS) systems. 

In order for observations to be useful, they must be communicated to decision makers (via intermediary services). Each cyber sensor is subsequently a net-centric service. Individual cyber analyzers subscribe to the specific observations that they require for their analysis. As a sensor observes its domain, it continually publishes observations to its subscribers. 

In the following subsections we describe the components of this demonstration in greater detail. We begin by briefly describing the net-centric BMD system, then follow with a description of the cyber attack. We conclude this section by describing the illustration-of-concept NCDS implementation that we used to mitigate the cyber attack. 

Our NCDS architecture was deployed during the demonstration of a proof-of-concept net-centric BMD decision-support system [10]. Similar to our NCDS architecture, this system uses SOA services to strengthen the Ballistic-Missile-Defense OODA loop. 

One principal component of the net-centric BMD system is the Radar-Sensor Service, which publishes radar data that authorized users may subscribe to through a web interface. (These services are analogous to NCDS Sensor Services.) This radar data is consumed by subsequent analytical components, which ultimately present the data as an executive summary to an end user who acts as a decision-maker. Without the data feed from the radar-sensor service, situational awareness for the entire BMD mission is lost. 

KB compressed). A large portion of this communication overhead is due to the message format imposed by our net-centric messaging protocol. In future work it will be important to significantly reduce the network overhead of sensors and analyzers since we expect them to continually publish data throughout the network. 

As the DoD increases its reliance on net-centric systems it becomes increasingly important to protect those systems from cyber attack. Towards this end, we have developed the Net-centric Cyber-Decision-Support (NCDS) architecture. Our architecture aims to improve the user s ability to quickly enact good decisions that will remedy faults at run time. Oiu approach to siu vivability stands to advance the state of the practice by leveraging existing dependabihty approaches in two ways. 

Succeeding in such a large-scale operational-like event required a team of 25 people, all of whom we would like to thank. In particular John Urbano was key to the development and integration of the cyber-survivability components within the net-centric framework. 

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