Mortar battalions, 4.2-inch

The determination, mentioned above, to convert the chemical weapons units to the 8i-mm. mortar naturally interrupted negotiations regarding the HE 4.2 mortar shell. A personal conference between General Porter and General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, resolved the issue in favor of the 4.2-inch mortar, a decision followed by steps to equip the mortar battalions with the approved weapon. Later came the authorization to produce a high explosive filling for the 4.2-inch mortar shell. ... 

The fighting in Italy had altered mortar commanders views as to the desirability of the -ton truck. Too much had been expected of these vehicles. The i%-ton trucks were still needed to haul ammunition from army supply points to the mortar battalion dumps and on to company dumps. Earlier thoughts on transportation had been conditioned by the experience of the fast-moving Sicilian campaign operations in Italy, characterized by slow movements and static situations, brought about the change. Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World War II, p. II, Italian Campaign, p. io . 

Field artillery officers were impressed by the amount of effective fire produced by a chemical mortar company as compared to that of an artillery unit. Maj. John D. Tolman, who commanded the 8zd Chemical Mortar Battalion from 26 April until the close of the Luzon Campaign, disclosed that infantry commanders felt they could not "properly accomplish [their] mission [without] 4.2-inch mortar sup-... 

The elements of Reckless Task Force had chemical mortar support for the Hollandia operation, but this support came from a rather odd source. Because of a shortage of mortar units in the zone of interior the War Department in February 1944 authorized the SWPA to convert a tank destroyer battalion to a chemical mortar battalion at the earliest practicable date. Almost immediately the theater reorganized the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion which, after a brief period of training, participated in the Hollandia operation, under command of Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin. But redesignation waited until Jime 1944, producing the anomalous situation of a so-called tank destroyer unit firing 4.2-inch chemical mortars. ... 

Troops of 30 Chemical Mortar Battalion, firing 4.2-inch mortars in le Tholy area, France, October 1944. 

While the principal mission of the mortar battalions was the dispersion of toxic agents and smoke, the CWS was of the opinion that the battalions could be profitably used to fire high explosives in support of the infantry. Before any such assignment was possible two preliminary steps were necessary. First, the War Department would have to approve a military requirement for a high explosive (HE) shell for the 4.2-inch mortar, and secondly, the Army Ground Forces would have to be convinced that the 4.2-inch mortar could be used to advantage in supplementing the 105-mm. howitzer in close support of the Infantry. 

Weapons available to American ground troops for delivering toxic agents included Livens projectors, grenades, land mines, mortars, rockets, and artillery shells. If gas warfare had broken out, the burden would have fallen chiefly on the 4.2-inch chemical mortars of CWS mortar battalions. 

November the War Department increased the maintenance factor from 7 percent to percent, but experience in Italy outmoded the new factor before it was received. By the end of 1943 General Porter had personally intervened to secure air shipment of 12 mortars and a few critical mortar parts to the theater. In all, late in 1943 and early in 1944, 172 mortars were scheduled to arrive by air or by convoy to relieve the situation in which depot stocks were nil and there was an actual shortage of 16 mortars in the operating battalions. Also in November 1943, the first serious theaterwide shortage of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition was reported. Despite the mortar shipments and the 40,000 rounds of HE mortar shell en route to the theater, supply proved to be insuflScient. ... 

CWS ofiScers in North Africa exerted every effort to acquaint infantry commanders with the chemical mission, including the 4.2-inch mortar and its proper employment. Even before the arrival of the chemical battalions they conducted demonstrations with 4.2-inch mortar WP shells, colored grenades, and flame throwers. With the arrival of the first three battalions CWS officers were able to hold mortar demonstrations for the chief of staff of Seventh Army and other high ranking officers. ... 

In January 1945 Fifth Army received reports of the hardships encountered in other theaters and in the United States with the fuzes for the M3 4.2-inch mortar ammunition which, unfortunately, made up the bulk of 4.2-inch ammunition in the theater. Nonetheless, during February the 84th and looth Battalions used over 11,000 roimds of the suspected ammunition without particular difficulty. On 9 March a shell burst three feet from the barrel of one mortar, killing one man and wounding four others. Thereafter, mortar crews used lanyards to fire suspected ammunition, a precaution which at first reduced the efficiency of mortar crews. ... 

From the conclusion of the Gothic Line fighting in the fall of 1944 until the spring of 1943 Fifth Army troops remained in relatively the same positions. April saw an army offensive which cracked German defenses in a matter of a week. The 84th and looth Battalions supported the IV and II Corps, respectively, in this operation until the infantry advance was too swift for effective support. It was at this time that 4.2-inch mortar operations in the Mediterranean theater came to an end. ... 

In support of the entire Metz operation the 8ist Chemical Battalion fired j 1,118 rounds of ammunition. During part of the time a shortage of artillery shell enhanced the role of the 4.2-inch mortar. ... 

---