Mental properties neurological

Many of our best predictions and explanations of human behavior come at the higher level of beliefs, desires, and intentions. If we take our cue from philosophy of science, then we want to say that these irreducible higher-level properties are causal properties. We do not need to reduce these mental states to neurological states. Just as real scientific explanations occur at multiple levels of explanation, and just as irreducible higher-level properties are causal in scientific practice, such is often the case with mental causation. Mental causation is just another case of higher-level causation. And just as the causal mechanism often occurs at higher-levels in science, so it often occurs at the level of irreducible mental properties. 

I start with the case for holding that one group of mental properties cannot possibly be neurological properties. 

Let s now see how similar points apply to mental properties. First, we need to outline the case for dualism about mental properties. We have seen that one class of mental properties - those we ascribe with the words pain, belief that snow is white, and so on those we believe a subject to instantiate when we use those words of them - cannot be neurological properties. They are some kind of functional property. But equally, as we also saw, it is a discovery of neuroscience that the causal roles played by mental properties are played by neurological properties. Moreover, the roles are those we take mental properties to play - what kind of state makes us wince pain This would seem to imply that mental properties are neurological properties, contrary to the conclusion reached earlier. What on earth is going on ... 

SED-13,1311) (1). Protirelin has neurotransmitter properties and has been used to treat a variety of neurological disorders, including intractable epilepsy (2). Some experiments have also been performed to evaluate its effects in mental disorders. 

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