Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Chemical supply experience in the North African and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations passed through several phases, each illustrative of a development in both the theater supply system and the chemical supply system. The terms theater supply system and chemical supply system are employed advisedly, because the theater system and each technical service system tended to develop independently although both were dependent to a considerable degree upon the War Department system. But that War Department system was only eight months old at the time of the landings in North Africa, and, as it was never able completely to overcome the traditional autonomy of the technical services in the United States, so was it even less able to exert its influence bn the theater technical services through the intermediary of the theater organization. 

Leghorn marked the end of American participation in port screening in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Rear area missions gradually petered out with the diminished effectiveness of the Luftwaffe. The lyid and 179th Smoke Generator Companies, by now the only U.S. smoke units in Italy, turned to a type of employment that had evolved earlier in the theater—the use of smoke in forward areas. But before the development of that mission smoke units had been used in assault landings. 

CARTWHEEL The Reduction of Rabaul Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls Campaign in the Marianas The Approach to the Philippines Leyte The Return to the Philippines Triumph in the Philippines Okinawa The Last Battle Strategy and Command The First Two Years The Mediterranean Theater of Operations... 

The USCWC undertook to make statistical studies of theater stocks of chemical munitions beginning in December 1943. From these studies the committee evolved certain fundamental principles upon which future committee recommendations were based. One principle was that in the event the Axis Powers used gas U.S. retaliation should be immediate and intensive, with airplanes flying 150 percent of their normal number of missions during the first fifteen days of gas warfare. After this initial effort, in which bomb loads would consist of 75-percent gas munitions and 25-percent high explosives, the normal number of aircraft missions would be flown with 50 percent of the bomb load consisting of gas. Additional principles were that the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations, where the United Nations were on the strategic offensive, should have... 

Records of U.S. Commands in the European, Mediterranean, and Africa-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations (Record Group 492) Records of Allied and U.S. Army Commands, China-Burma-India Theater of Operations (World War II) (Record Group 493)... 

Records of U.S. Commands in the European, Mediterranean, and Africa-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations (Record Group 492)... 

From the conclusion of the Gothic Line fighting in the fall of 1944 until the spring of 1943 Fifth Army troops remained in relatively the same positions. April saw an army offensive which cracked German defenses in a matter of a week. The 84th and looth Battalions supported the IV and II Corps, respectively, in this operation until the infantry advance was too swift for effective support. It was at this time that 4.2-inch mortar operations in the Mediterranean theater came to an end. ... 

Portable flame throwers contributed as little to the success of operations in the European theater as they had in the Mediterranean. The weapon was infrequently used, and not always successfully. Some... 

The only elements having just as great a variety of chemical experience were to be found in the field armies in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Since Shadle preferred to emphasize his own staffi role and to give field elements their head, Colonels Barker and Guild in Fifth Army and Colonel Humphreville in Seventh Army found themselves, again by their own preference, operating a CWS of their own. Barker and Coblentz, in a unique partnership, carried on development and manufacture and operated their own supply system. As a result, there was less co-ordination and unity in the CWS in the North African and Mediterranean theater than elsewhere in the world, but again the required job was done. The much lesser threat of gas warfare in die Mediterranean area made it particularly appropriate to accomplish the CWS administrative task differently there. 

The first of the troubleshooting problems the CWS dealt with in the Mediterranean area was that of item overages and shortages. The second was the fact. that the condition of some material on reaching the theater was such that extensive repair, renovation, or adaptation was required—this was the maintenance problem. There were many other troubleshooting problems, but, examples of the overages and shortages and of maintenance problems not only demonstrate solutions but also show how the practice of impetus from the front operated. 

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