Mass casualty biological

A toxin s toxicity, ease of production, and stability are inextricably interconnected. Regardless of its toxicity, a toxin that cannot be produced in sufficient quantity or is too unstable to survive as an aerosol after delivery cannot be an effective mass casualty biological weapon (MCBW). Slightly less toxic toxins that are easy and inexpensive to produce and deliver, and that are stable as aerosols, could be real threats, however. 

Guidelines for Mass Casualty Decontamination During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident. Prepared by U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD (January) 2000. 

Cone D., Koenig K. L. (2005). Mass casualty triage in the chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environment. European Journal Emergency Medicine, 12, 287-302. 

Sprinzak, E. (2000). On not overstating the problem. In B. Roberts (Ed.), Hype or reality The new terrorism and mass casualty attacks (p. IS). Alexandria, VA Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. 

The framework of the book is consistent with the United States National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and is based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention s (GDC) Competencies for public health preparedness and the GDC Guidelines for response to chemical, biological, and radiological events. This textbook will provide nurses with a heightened awareness for disasters and mass casualty incidents, a solid foundation of knowledge (educational competencies) and a tool box of skills (occupational competencies) to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. 

Terrorists can choose from countless biological agents and the list can seem overwhelming. However, to best protect our patients and their families, primary care clinicians should focus their attention on the agents that terrorists are most likely to use and that have the greatest potential for mass casualties. The CDC has defined three categories of agents, A, B, and C with potential as weapons, based on several criteria (1) (see Table 2.2) ... 

In an attempt to think outside the box, the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) attempted to discover possible alternative ambulatory decontamination facilities, which would be able to supplement standard shower decontamination in the event of a large scale mass casualty event. One such alternative would be to use an Olympic-sized, heated swimming pool. The SBCCOM calculated that such a swimming pool as a communal bath with soap (and the water already present) could decontaminate large numbers (well in excess of 100,000 people) of ambulatory casualties exposed to nonconvulsive doses of the nerve agent sarin (SBCCOM, January 2002). The dilution factor of the large quantity of water would keep it nontoxic for many tens, if not hundreds of thousands, of people. 

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