Inadequate Executive Oversight

Even though nuclear plant operations carry sizeable financial risks as well as grave career risks, sufficient co-owner-CEO involvement does not always exist. As a JNOC formation decision could well be a bet your company decision, the CEO (together with his or her Board of Directors) is the principal executive to be entrusted with this heady responsibility. 

Nonetheless, it is all too common for a group of CEOs to initially meet and reach conceptual agreement on forming a JNOC, and then to turn the project over to a committee of their direct reports. What typically results is a plethora of even lower level committees being formed, each carrying out their work without an adequate framework for a disciplined review or formation process. 

Utility CEOs would be well advised to concentrate on those deal breakers that might prevent the successful formation of the JNOC — and to stay personally involved in the details until analysis shows the JNOC to be a good (or bad) idea for that utility. They should also insist on seeing those compen- 

Executive management should also keep in mind that JNOC formation without retention of the best personnel and practices is likely to result in severe performance degradation. Their active participation in the process helps maintain the correct strategic focus during data collection, analysis, evaluation, and implementation, and also helps cut through the inevitable internal/bureaucratic obstacles to progress. 

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Inadequate executive oversight and involvement by all owner utilities... 

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