Foundational physical theories scope

Perhaps we ought to infer from this limited scope of actual applicability of foundational physical theories a denial of their purported universality. Perhaps we ought to think of the world s ontology, its natures, as being as diverse and pluralistic as the rich world of special sciences, with their idiosyncratic concepts and laws of limited applicability, that we use actually to describe and explain nature s behavior. 

But, it has been trenchantly argued, if the domain of a theory is properly taken to be the class of happenings in the world the theory can actually desctibe and explain, then foundational physical theories have no such universal scope. First, consider the fact that for most of what we want desctibed and explained in the world, such theories have no applicability at all. Who ever provided a description of the behavior of a chimpanzee, say, in terms of relativistic quantum field theory, and who ever explained failure of competitive equilibrium in markets with natural monopolistic aspects, say, by reference to the elementary particles of the world and their dynamics in spacetime ... 

Chapters 2 and 3 contain discussion on the theoretical foundations of hardness. The extensive classical theory of crystal strength has been omitted intentionally, since this subject is covered in most monographs within the scope of solid body physics and chemistry. Chapter 3 is based on the study of Povarennykh (1963), Hardness of Minerals, which most appropriately emphasizes the elements of the crystallomechanical theory of hardness that specifically find application in practice. 

Our foundational theories in physics are generally credited as being the very best science that we have got. Their universality of scope, their exactness of prediction, their depth of explanatory force are all unmatched by the theoretical accomplishments of the various special sciences. But careful reflection on just how these theories function to provide us with descriptions, predictions, and explanations appropriate to the world in which we live shows us that there are profound puzzles lurking in the way these theories function in our scientific account of the world, puzzles that beg for the detailed, careful, and thorough exploration of the methodologist of science. 

Even within physics itself, many have convincingly argued, there are many systems of the world whose behavior can be dealt with only by the use of concepts and regularities that fall outside the scope of the foundational theories. In describing and explaining the behavior of these systems, aspects of the foundational theories may sometimes be invoked, but one can deal with these systems fully only if one introduces novel concepts, and novel regularities framed in these novel terms, that go beyond the foundational theories and that themselves may have limited domains of applicability. 

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