Explosive containment chamber

Is the technology in use for any type of material, even one not related to CWM in the U.S. Yes. Has been used extensively to destroy conventional munitions including smokes, WP, and CS. No. Dynasafe explosive containment chambers are in use in the U.S., but chemical munition processing and agent destruction has not been demonstrated in the United States. Yes, the EDS has been used extensively to destroy a variety of old munitions and agents, including GB nerve agent. 

A floor plan for MAPS is shown in Figure 2-1. Operators will drill or cut the munition and drain the chemical agent from the munition body in an explosive containment chamber. The separated explosives will then be detonated in a commercial detonation vessel. The chemical agent will be transported to and neutralized in the Chemical Transfer Facility (CTF) already located at APG. 

This item is also located in the process room. The explosive containment chamber (ECC) is where the munitions will be either cut or drilled. In the event of an accidental detonation during the cutting or drilling, the ECC is designed to withstand a blast of up to 13 pounds of TNT without a vapor release but is expected to be used to destroy projectiles not exceeding 5 pounds of TNT equivalent. 

World War Il-era chemical weapon shells have recently been recovered by Japan at Kanda port, as part of preparations for the construction of a new airport. The munitions have been recovered manually by workers wearing special armoured diving suits, are placed into an explosive containment chamber where they are then detonated. 

Although not many cases are expected, any energetic materials contaminated with agent must be decontaminated or destroyed. One alternative is to dissolve the entire munition in an acid bath (Battelle, 1999). Another is to destroy the energetics in the Army s explosive destruction system (EDS),2 a portable self-contained chamber in which two to six bursters can be handled at one time (Thompson, 2000a U.S. Army, 2001a). 

What, if any, are the scale-up requirements needed to implement the technology None. Available models can destroy projectiles up to 210 mm in diameter. None. DAVINCH has destroyed large Japanese recovered CWM (1 meter long, 0.2 meters diameter, 19 kg mustard agent/ lewisite agent mix). Volume of inner vessel is 30 times that of EDS-2 and explosive containment is 20 times EDS-2. None. May want to increase explosive containment capability beyond 5.1-lb TNT equivalent or increase physical size of detonation chamber beyond 2-meter diameter if need exists for greater capability. None, although there are size limitations on the types of munitions that can be destroyed. 

The Dynasafe SDC2000 static detonation chamber is manufactured by D masafe AB, a Swedish company. The detonation chamber has an explosion containment capability of 2.3 kg TNT-equivalent NEW and is a nearly spherical, armored, double-shelled, high-alloy... 

The explosion containment capabilities of the Dynasafe static kilns are comparable to those of the EDS-1 and EDS-2 in use by the U.S. Army 2.64 pounds TNT-equivalent for the SK1200 vs. 3 pounds for the EDS-1 and 5.06 pounds TNT-equivalent for the larger SK2000 vs. 5 pounds for the EDS-2. The detonation chamber of the SK2000 is substantially larger than the EDS-2 chamber it has the approximate shape of a... 

The procedure whereby a Iktle alcohol is rapidly added to the vessel, supported in the funae chamber and containing some concentrated nitric acid, although generally preceded by a short period of induction, may be extremely dangerous and should not be used. Under no circumstances should concentrated nitric acid be euided to ethyl alcohol—a violent explosion may result. 

In some cases, it is impractical to use a plenum chamber under the constriction plate. This condition arises when a flammable or explosive mixture of gases is being introduced to the reactor. One solution is to pipe the gases to a multitude of individual gas inlets in the floor of the reactor. In this way it may be possible to maintain the gas velocities in the pipes above the flame velocity or to reduce the volume of gas in each pipe to the point at which an explosion can be safely contained. Another solution is to provide separate inlets for the different gases and depend on mixing in the fluidized bed. The inlets should be fairly close to one another, as lateral gas mixing in fluidized beds is poor. 

With the tests of percent hydrogen in air around 25% - 30%, reactions were observed which did not make the lid pop up. For instance, with percent hydrogen in air at 25% - 30% and the pressure at 150 torr, the chamber did not explode with enough force to pop up the lid there was only a quick flash in the chamber. Although an explosion did not occur to over-pressurize the vessel, an internal reaction did, the pressures of which are shown in Figure 5. This reaction, though contained and silent, is evidence that a reaction can occur in deeper vacuum, and in richer and leaner hydrogen concentrations than evidenced by observation of over-pressurization. 

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