Chalmers, David

Chalmers, David. 1996. The conscious mind. Oxford Oxford University Press. 

Chalmers, David. 2002. On sense and intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16 135-182. 

Chalmers, David. 2004. Epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies 118 153-226. 

Chalmers, David. 2006. The foundations of two-dimensional semantics. In Two-dimensional semantics Foundations and applications, ed. Jose Macia and Manuel Garda-Carpintero, 55-140. Oxford Oxford University Press. 

Chalmers, David. 2011. Propositions and attitude ascriptions. A Fregean account. Nods 45 595-639. 

Place, Ullin. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process. British Journal of Psychology 47 44-50. Place, Ullin. 1960. Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69 101-104. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009. On what grounds what. In Metametaphysics New essays on the foundations of ontology, ed. David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 347-383. Oxford Oxford University Press. 

This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant CPE 8304381, the Department of Planning and Economic Development of the State of Hawaii, and the Coral Industries Endowment. The authors thank Dr. Maria Burka (NSF), Kent Keith and Dr. Tak Yoshihara (DPED), and David Chalmers (Coral Industries) for their interest in this work. The authors also thank William Mok for his continuing assistance with the flow reactor, Dr. A1 i Tabatabaie-Raissi, and Professor Maitland Jones (Princeton) for many stimulating discussions. The comments of the reviewers were appreciated. 

Binding via synchronicity occurs in milliseconds to seconds. Binding via chemical modulation occurs in minutes to hours. We need both, and we must make the best of both until we understand the mother of all questions how does the synchronous and chemically coherent activation of brain cells result in conscious experience in the first place How, after all, is the nervous system involved in subjective experience - what the philosophers call qualia - and what David Chalmers dubs the hard problem Chalmers asserts that neuroscience has not yet, and may never, solve the hard problem. If you love a mystery, and want to avoid the implications of what neuroscience is saying, you have a way out here. Neuroscientists are no more believable than anyone who waves his hands and says And then a miracle happens . The brain is a colony of neurons it thinks and therefore it is. 

Frank Jackson (1998a) and David Chalmers (1996) characterize physicalism as the claim that every truth is necessitated by the totality of truths in the complete language of ideal fundamental physics and the laws of fundamental physics and a statement to the effect that this is the totality of fundamental truths and laws. (The latter can be avoided by restricting the characterization to positive truths.) They hold additionally that the entailments required by physicalism are a priori. I do not assume that here. David Lewis (1983) earlier provided a similar characterization of physicalism. There are issues concerning how to define fundamental physical property or ideal physics and whether this account is sufficient for physicalism. (It is surely necessary.) I discuss these issues in Loewer (2001). 

David Chalmers (2012, p. 362) describes his view as at least a close relative of the Canberra Plan, even though he is skeptical of the explicit definition aspect of the view. However, he has in the past endorsed something that sounds very Canberrish, for example, here ... 

I am grateful to Eliza Block, David Chalmers, Kit Fine, Jaegwon Kim, David Sosa, and Jared Warren for critiques of an earlier draft. 

Devrishi Goswami , David P Marciano, Bruce D. PascaP, Michael J. Chalmers, and Patrick R. Griffin ... 

David Chalmers (2004) suggests that epistemologically explicated notions of meaning may play a role in some contexts, whereas metaphysictdly explicated notions may play a role in others, and none of these is more fundamental than the other. See Sect. 5.7 for a discussion. Similarly, Albert Newen introduces meanings as vector spaces (1996), which comprise several semantic values for expressions. 

David Chalmers attempt to model core features of Fregean senses within a two-dimensional framework provides the resources to mimic at least some of the features presented above, so that a similar explication in terms of the 2-D framework can be given. On this view, what has here been called a conceptual difference, turns out to be an epistemological difference - a difference in epistemicaUy defined primary intensions of expressions. Let me, first, introduce the core ideas of Chalmers theory, then apply it to the case of reduction and finally hint to two problems that seem to occur within the framework. The summary to follow draws heavily... 

The author thanks doctors Richard Prankerd and David Chalmers for their insightful discussions and valuable suggestions. 

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