Supervenience/exclusion argument

Kim s supervenience/exclusion argument has received a lot of discussion, so I will be going over some well (in some cases very well) tread ground. Here is how Kim recently formulates the exclusion argument (Kim, 2004, p. 39). 

My next chapter focuses issues of closure, drainage, and seepage. I discuss Ned Block s criticism that Kim s exclusion argument leads to the problems of seepage (i.e., causation at any irreducible supervenient level will always be pre-empted by causation at a subvenient level below it) and drainage (i.e., if matter is infinitely divisible, and there is no lowest level, then causation will drain away endlessly and we will be left with no... 

This type of objection to nonreductive materialism is central to the work of Jaegwon Kim. Kim discusses this objection extensively in the various versions of his exclusion argument or supervenience argument. He holds that the only way to give mental properties a causal role is to functionally reduce them to physical properties, since physical causation will always rule out causation in virtue of irreducible mental... 

If these are the only kinds of cases that can be called cases of causal overdetermination, then Kim is right that it is absurd to think that all cases of mental causation are cases of overdetermination. If we use the term overdetermination as Kim seems to here, then we should reject the idea that P is causally overdetermined by M and P. Surely M and P are not completely independent and individually sufficient causes for P. Rather, M and P are related by supervenience (and possibly also by realization and event identity as well). It is not as if M could have caused P even if P had not occurred. If P had not occurred, M would not have occurred either - M depends on P for its existence. Thus, it seems plausible to accept premise (7) in Kim s exclusion argument - i.e. that P is not causally overdetermined by M and P. 

The above considerations show that as long as we hold M and P to be token identical events, Kim s plausible version of the exclusion principle will not rule out mental events as causal. This is good reason for the nonreductive materialist to hold a Davidsonian view of event identity. It seems that a mere supervenience or realization relation between M and P is not quite enough. In addition to supervenience and realization, it seems that we also need the token event identity of M and P, in order to avoid M getting ruled out as causal by the plausible exclusion principle. Thus, fijom this point forward, I will assume that any viable nonreductivist position requires that M and P are token identical events. I will, from now on, assume a Davidsonian event identity. 3.3 Kim s second formulation of the exclusion principle Kim s second formulation of the exclusion principle, which actually appears in the exclusion argument is as follows ... 

So it seems that in this scenario, where we have closure at L - 1 with respect to L, the exclusion principle and seepage will both apply. The causal powers of properties at L will always be preemped by properties at L - 1. Causation need not seep down to a lowest closed level for the exclusion argument to work. Instead, it seems that if the exclusion principle applies to all irreducible supervenient levels, then whenever there is closure of a subvenient level with respect to its supervenient level, causation will seep... 

So, here s the exclusion argument itself Suppose that some M-instantiation causes an TVf-instantiation. By supervenience, we know that the -instantiation has a physical supervenience base, But P -instantiation is nomologicaUy sufficient for AP-instantiation. It therefore appears that Af and P each have a claim to being responsible for the instantiation of Af on this occasion, and the two claims appear to be in tension with each other. The only plausible way to resolve this tension is to conclude that the Af-instantiation causes the AP-instantiation by causing a P-instantiation. But, again by supervenience, Afhas a supervenience base, P. By the causal closure of the physical, the P-instantiation must have a complete physical cause — presumably, the P-instantiation. But now P and M are in direct competition for being the cause of the P-instantiation. ... 

So, to sum up (i) functional reduction is not economical reduction functional properties cannot be reduced to realizer properties even in the most favorable, single-realizer scenarios. (2) Microbased properties cannot be economically reduced to (any of) their supervenience base properties. (3) The exclusion argument can be reformulated in terms of a notion of supervenience that permits properties of wholes to supervene on properties of parts, and this puts higher-level, microbased properties into competition with their lower-level constituent properties. Finally, (4) the incoherence and conventionality objections can be mounted against any and all properties that have not been economically reduced. 

How does mind fit into nature Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding lineup of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim s work. The chapters cluster around two themes first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated, and, second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. 

Kim s exclusion/supervenience argument poses central problems for any nonreductive physicalist position. This argument relies on Kim s principle of causal exclusion or the exclusion principle. Kim s most recent formulation of the principle of causal exclusion holds the following ... 

Kim s Exclusion/Supervenience Argument 2.1 The problem for nonreductive materialism... 

Kim s criticisms of nonreductive materialism attempt to show, primarily through the use of his exclusion or supervenience argument, that irreducible mental properties carmot be causal properties. I argue, against this, that the reductionist picture of causation created by the exclusion principle is deeply mistaken, and I offer an accoxmt of how irreducible mental properties can be causal properties. 

As Kim observes, supervenience isn t needed for the argument. The conflict is among P, Closure, and Exclusion. It appears then that the argument works equally well against NRP and against nonphysicalist views. ... 

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