Stackelberg follower

The manufacturer sells to the retailer at a unit wholesale price and incurs a unit cost which includes manufacturing and logistics, and potentially also sells through a direct channel at a different unit cost. The retailer decides on the retail price as Stackelberg follower. 

From the condition 21a it immediately follows that if the clathrate is formed in the presence of a number of compounds which are potential solutes, i.e., sufficiently small to have 0 for some i, all these compounds contribute to its stability. As has already been pointed out by Barrer and Stuart4 this at once explains the stabilizing influence of "Hilfsgase" such as air, C02, or H2S on the formation of gas hydrates discussed by Villard49 and von Stackelberg and Meinhold.47 If there is only one solute, Eq. 21a with the = sign determines the minimum vapor pressure fiA necessary to make the clathrate stable relative to Qa. Since all cavities contribute to the stabilization, one cannot say that this minimum pressure is controlled by a specific type of cavity. 

KBr03 (c). The heat of solution data yield the following values for S400 Berthelot,45 —9.32 Thomsen,15 —10.12 and Stackelberg,1 —9.87. 

K2Cr207 (c). The data on the heat of solution yield the following values for (S40o Graham,2 ( ) Morges,1 —16.61 Berthelot,95 —16.20 Thomsen,15 —16.70 Stackelberg,1 —16.68. We have selected the average of the last two values. 

Two classifications of the chemical nature of the guest molecule have been proposed. The first scheme by von Stackelberg (1956) was a combination of both size and chemical nature as discussed in Section 1.2.3. The second scheme by Jeffrey and McMullan (1967) characterized the guest molecules in one of the following four groups (1) hydrophobic compounds, (2) water-soluble acid gases, (3) water-soluble polar compounds, and (4) water-soluble ternary or quaternary alkylammonium salts. 

The implications from this are that firms should be expected to maximize the dual objectives of profits and sales if (1) managers are powerful relative to shareholders, or (2) the market structure is oligopolistic and quantity leadership provides a profit advantage. It follows that managers might find it optimal to use the lump sum represented by their grandfathered allowances as a war chest with which to reduce prices and increase sales in the output market, in an attempt to take Stackelberg leadership, as outlined earlier. 

The use of the Cournot model instead of other competition representations (Bertrand, Stackelberg, limit price, etc.) is not only justified by the support of the literature or its tractability, but also by the fact that it is compatible with the following quotations from cement manufacturers and analysts (Oxera, 2004) ... 

The first experimental determinations of the effect of pressure on solubility were made by E. von Stackelberg, who obtained values which are in qualitative agreement with Braun s law and the theorem of Le Chatelier, as the following table shows —... 

Proposition 5. There is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution pair in the single-period game with a powerful retailer and without starting inventory that is characterized by the following system of equations ... 

The retailer s objective function is clearly concave, and the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium follows. Finally, the optimality conditions are found by equating the first derivatives to zero. 

Yang et al. (2015) A S, T BOM CE, CO MIP, GA MN QN, A Coordination between product designers and supply chain managers following the Stackelberg game approach... 

Yadav SR, Muddada RRMR, Tiwari MK, Shankar R (2009) An algorithm portfolio based solution methodology to solve a supply chain optimization problem. Expert Syst Appl 36 8407-8420 Yang D, Jiao JR, Ji Y, Du G, Helo P, Valente A (2015) Joint optimization for coordinated configuration of product families and supply chains by a leader-follower Stackelberg game. Eur J Oper Res 246 263-280... 

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