Sino-Soviet relations

See Steven Goldstein, Nationalism and Internationalism Sino-Soviet Relations, in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1994). 

Ray Cline, Sino-Soviet Relations, 14 January 1963, FRUS 1961-3, XXII, p. 340. Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (EA) paper, n.d., ibid., pp. 397-8. But as Paul Kreisberg, who headed the ACA from 1965 to 1981, pointed out, this bureaucratic distinction also helped to foster an official lobby that was primarily interested in Communist China and not just dealing with it as an enemy, but broadening and increasing the levels of contacts with it. Kreisberg oral history interview, 8 April 1989, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Georgetown University Library, pp. 1-2. 

DoS and USIA to all U.S. diplomatic posts, Info Policy Guidance on Sino-Soviet Relations, Z4 July 1963, Box 3863, CFPF(i963) DoS to all U.S. diplomatic posts, US Attitude Towards Sino-Soviet Relations, 7 May 1964, Box Z019, CFPF( 1964-6) HK to DoS, Communist China - US Policy Assessment, 17 February 1967, Box 1974, CFPF(i967-9), RG59, NA, p. 16. 

Together, the nature of the 1960s discourse of reconciliation with China and the official reservations of the Johnson administration regarding the Sino-Soviet split suggest that, had it been faced with the dramatic deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations that occurred in the spring of 1969, the Johnson administration would most likely have chosen to continue with... 

Memcon, Sino-Soviet Relations Europe, 27 November 1974, Box 372, Lord Files, pp. 21-2. 

Option 3. This is the option that Nixon and Kissinger claim to have pursued, in which the United States would simultaneously improve relations with both the Soviet Union and China. By creating a triangular relationship, they attempted to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict. By maintaining better relations with Beijing and Moscow than they did with each other, the United States would be able exert leverage both ways and to... 

INR, Communist China/USSR Peking Accentuates the Positive, ii August 1969, Box r975> CFPF(i967—9), RG59, NA William Burr, Sino-American Relations, 1969 The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps towards Rapprochement, Cold War History 1(3) (April 2001), pp. 86-90. 

It is clear, however, that as the evidence mounted for Soviet militancy and a possible strike against China from August 1969 onward, Nixon decided to take more obvious cautionary steps to warn Moscow to show restraint, and conciliatory steps to reassure China that the United States would not cooperate with the Soviet Union against it. In the months that followed, the White House worked with State to send the public messages to Moscow and Beijing that the United States would not exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict, wanted to improve relations with both sides, and would be markedly concerned by a Soviet attack on China. 

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