Safety phenomenology

Miller, L. A., et al., 1990, Application of Phenomenological Calculations to the N-Reactor Probabilistic Risk Assessment, ANS Topical Meeting, The Safety, Status and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities, Boise, ID, Sept. 31 - Octobier 4, 1990. 

Groothuizen, Th. M., J. W. Hartgerink, and H. J. Pasman, "Phenomenology, Test Methods, and Case Histories of Explosions in Liquids and Solids," Loss Prev. Safety Prom. Process Ind., 239 (1974). 

Does the training support documentation cover all aspects relevant to use of the EOFs (relevant phenomenology theory, safety concepts, etc.) ... 

The high-level radioactive wastes (HLW s) produced at nuclear power plants must be isolated from the population for an extremely long time, i.e., more than 10,000 years. There are plans to construct HLW disposal facilities in deep underground repositories. Thus, the safety of the barrier system must be evaluated for time scales in excess of 10,000 years this is beyond the scope of any conventional scientific experiment-based approach. We need to use an alternative method that is based on a macro-phenomenological approach. 

Fiorini, G.L., et.al.. The ABACUS Programme Experimental Study of Phenomenology Involving Subassembly Blockage Computer Codes., - ENS Safety Lyon, France, 13-23 July, 1982, Proceedings - Vol. IV (1982). 

Safety tests and analysis The overall objective of the IFR safety analysis task is to develop understanding of the phenomenology which controls the safety performance of the IFR metallic fuel, to provide the experimental data to validate the unique safety features of the IFR, and to fiilly characterize the safety features associated with the BFR concept. Primary activities were ... 

Current activities in the severe accident domain are addressed by translating these understandings of phenomenology into their resultant safety implications and capturing this phenomenology in disruption models for the SAS4A severe accident analysis code. 

Safety, in the guise of Safety-I, is defined as a condition where the number of adverse outcomes (accidents/incidents/near misses) is as low as possible. It follows from this definition that the phenomenology of Safety-I is the occurrence of adverse... 

Since the phenomenology of Safefy-I refers to the things that go wrong or can go wrong, adverse outcomes as well as adverse events, the aetiology of Safefy-I musf perforce be abouf the ways in which this can happen. In other words, the aetiology must be about the probable or possible causes and mechanisms that produce the manifestations. The aetiology thus represents the accident models that are associated with Safety-I. 

The purpose of the deconstruction of Safety-I was to find out whether the assumptions are still valid - which in turn means whether the perspective offered by Safety-1 remains valid. The deconstruction of Safety-1 showed that the phenomenology refers to adverse outcomes, to accidents, incidents and the like that the aetiology assumes that adverse outcomes can be explained in terms of cause-effect relationships, either simple or composite and that the ontology assumes that fundamentally something can either function or malfunction. 

Aetiology Aetiology is the study of causation and of why things occur, or even the study of the reasons or causes behind what happens. In relation to safety it is the study of the (assumed) reasons for or causes of the observable phenomena. The aetiology describes the mechanisms that produce the observable phenomena, the phenomenology. 

Ontology The ontology describes that which is. In this book, ontology is the study of what the foundation of safety is, rather than how it manifests itself (the phenomenology) or how these manifestations occur (the aetiology). 

However, capturing injunction on safety with a meta-concept reifies it and conducts to a paradox the loss of its reference. Injunction on safety is also an experience-based element, it is a phenomenological manifestation. 

At the present time there are basically two approaches used to model vapor explosions. The first approach is a mechanistic one where the various events during a severe accident are modeled in detail. This approach, while appealing, is better left to the evaluation of safety concerns because of a energetic vapor explosion in existing reactors or reactors that are in their final design stages. This method is expensive both in terms of model development and computer requirements. N any of the phenomenological models used in this type of analysis are at best crude representations of the actual phenomena, however, they are the best mechanistic model that researchers have been able to formulate at this time. 

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