SAFETY OF THE BELGONUCLEAIRE MOX FABRICATION PLANT

As a result of the end of the cold war and the subsequent agreements, one of the most pressing issues for the international community is to decide on the fissile material recovered from ongoing and planned dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. 

The weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu), in particular, should be transformed in a way that allows it to meet the spent fuel standard requirement, as defined by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences [1] and as retained in U.S. and Russian plans today. 

Two options have emerged from the various investigations carried out. They have been confirmed during the last G7/P8 extended expert meeting of October 1996 in Paris and described in the final PEIS issued in December 1996 [2] as clearly indicated in the Record of Decision of January 14, 1997, the options are  

Use it as nuclear fuel for electricity production in civil power plants and keep the remaining plutonium in association with the fission products in spent fuel in a once-through strategy  

Immobilize the WG-Pu with fission products to fabricate a highly radioactive but stable compound by vitrification, and to dispose of it in a deep geological repository. 

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The choice of using WG-Pu as nuclear fuel (i.e., MOX option) is natural considering that the technology is mature, proven, and timely and the technical, economic, and safeguards aspects are satisfactory. This paper describes the current experience in Belgium for MOX fabrication and the safety aspects related to the Belgonucleaire MOX fuel fabrication plant. 

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