Principles developed by the courts

Case law interpretation has had an adverse effect on some safety legislation. A notorious example is the fencing requirements for dangerous machinery (then s. 14 FA), as illustrated by, for example. Close v. Steel Company of Wales. With reluctance judges interpreted the statute so that s. 14 could not be used where parts of the machine or of the material being worked on have been ejected at a workman. This interpretation has now been remedied by reg. 12(3) of PUWER 1998 (repeating reg. 12(3) of 1992). 

Such interpretations affect the scope of legislation, and of civil action for breach of statutory duty. Breach of statutory duty and the tort of negligence 

Negligence is a relatively modem tort, but today it is probably the most important in number of cases and for the amount of damages which may be awarded for serious injury. 

Since 1988 the potentially wide scope of the duty of care has been narrowed so that there are now four indicators foresight of damage, proximity of the defendant to the plaintiff, policy and whether it is just and reasonable to impose a duty. A court will not necessarily refer to them all in the same case, but will look at the particular relationship. An important one is that of employer and employee. The duty of care owed to an employee is an implied term of the contract of employment (see section 1.1.19.4). In respect of premises, the common law duty of care owed by the occupier is now statutory (see section 1.1.19.5). 

Examples of health concerns, developed in the civil tort of negligence and which are receiving increasing attention in the courts and by the HSE, are workplace stress repetitive strain injury (RSI) and (WRULD) and vibration white finger (VWF).  

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