No-liability regime

Under a no-liability regime, firms would distinguish their products by safety and price. But this seems implausibly freewheeling, for toofhpaste firms could sell poisonous products. But why would they want to And why would consumers buy poison when other toothpaste firms could sell products certified by scientific laboratories If fhe value consumers place on information matched the cost to firms to develop and disseminate that information, firms would compete to provide it. 

These speculations lead me to argue that we should consider the possibility of a no-liability or buyer-beware liability regime. I believe the voluntary development and dissemination of information by firms about the consequences of exposure to their products would be much greater than it is today because consumers would realize... 

Priest (1988,190-94), however, argues that the explosion in product liability litigation has not measurably deterred accidental or job-related death rates. But he recognizes that simple time-series bivariate analysis is rather crude evidence, because there is no coun-terfactual of how many accidents would have occurred if a noliability, first-party-insurance regime had existed. 

Third, changes to the liability system that increase the expected value of damage awards will also increase the number of claims that arise from those who have suffered no damages (i.e., the fraudulent) (Hughes and Snyder 1989). The shift from a negligence regime to strict liability has increased the expected value of awards. That has... 

Statutory nuisance. Under the statutory nuisance regime in Part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, liability fell in the first instance on the person responsible for the nuisance , this term being expanded to mean the person to whose act, default or sufferance the nuisance is attributable .26 Responsibility would pass to the owner or occupier of the premises if no such person could be found or if the nuisance arises from any defect of a structural nature .27... 

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