NASA Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster

The NASA organization was highly complex and several parts of the project were contracted out to private consultants whose livelihood depended on the success of the project. Production objectives emphasized the importance of the launch date for each mission. In light of the safety concerns and potential setbacks, work continued on the project. Had the 

While the Challenger disaster was not a process incident in the strictest sense, the nature of the failure was similar to many piping system failures that typically occur in the process industries. More importantly, organizational failure was a fundamental cause of the incident. This case study serves as a classic example of the type of loss that can occur in a large complex organization if management systems are not effective. 

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Is it time to rethink the manned space program Despite the Columbia, Challenger, and Apollo disasters, NASA has called for the shuttle program to continue. President Bush s January 2004 initiative for a moon base and manned flights to Mars has led to much discussion about cost, safety, and priorities. 

FIGURE 13-2 An unmitigated disaster the horrible explosion of the space shuttle Challenger (Source NASA). 

The Chernobyl reactor, like the Titanic, was a technological masterpiece, but both had inherent and serious flaws in their design. Another technologically advanced design that failed disastrously was the NASA Space Shuttle Challenger. Other technological disasters, such as at Bhopal and Seveso, were more related to simple carelessness in design and operation. 

My historical analysis underscores how early policy and technological decisions became relatively permanent features of the shuttle s working environment. The International Space Station has also played a critical role in the operation of the shuttle program. History reveals historical parallels and repeated patterns at NASA in addition to the ones associated with the Challenger disaster. Historical developments have evolved into key constraints that reproduce failures at NASA. NASA and its constituencies will find it difficult to change these constraints and they may not want to change them. ... 

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