Holders of Primary Versus Derivative Group Rights

Identifying the Holders of Primary Versus Derivative Group Rights 

We have established that any agent capable of discursive control in relation to other agents can be a subject of a primary moral right (whether this capacity is realized or not). The possession of discursive control with respect to other agents 

Why should we not merely define the good or interest that is characteristic of a primary right against the undifferentiated rest of the world that the group sees as not-us without specifying the constitution of other agents that are not part of the 

That self-determination presently requires specific political powers for boundary maintenance is a contingent fact, but this contingency does not make the identification of a moral norm to regulate group relations impossible. I have already explained that contingent properties can acquire a normative dimension if agents have to interact to maintain these properties. 

It also should be noted that in the present international system self-determination is not conceived as the capacity of one worldwide political community to be shaped by the conditions of its internal life (and thus be self-determining, or in control of its future, in a non-relational sense). Such a community could exist. Its members would need to be able to maintain their group identity internally to avoid a split that would make some members outsiders, although they could not engage in self-determination as the exercise of freedom with respect to other similar communities. But if such a community did exist, the problem of moral entitlement to the 

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