Chemical and biological weapon defense

Although addressing military capabilities in general, these statements regarding capabilities-based planning are particularly relevant to the approach and solutions for chemical and biological weapons defense—and should provide the basis for the path forward for the Navy. 

Naval leadership should commit to strengthening and integrating chemical and biological weapons defense considerations into all naval functions. 

How can the principles elaborated in Chapter 1 be translated into real improvements in the chemical and biological weapons defense posture of U.S. naval forces This chapter explores the operational dimension and priorities for achieving tangible operational improvements, both near term and far term, regardless of the state of the art of supporting technical capabilities. The discussion, expanded in the remainder of the chapter, focuses on three basic findings and recommendations ... 

Franz, D.R. (1997). Defense against toxin weapons. In Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Textbook of Military Medicine series. Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty, Part I, 1st edition (R. Zajtchuk, ed.), pp. 603-19. Borden Institute, Washington, DC. 

According to Defense Planning Guidance, chemical and biological weapons are a likely condition of warfare. 5... 

Adopt a reasoned view of chemical and biological weapons exposure environments. In the Cold War, massive attack scenarios led to requirements for chemical and biological defense for the Services on the basis of exposures at the point of release (i.e., the highest level). The risk-based approach recommended by the committee ties levels of protection not to the worst case, but to an accep-... 

Adopt a reasoned view of chemical and biological weapons exposure environments—not simply worst-case scenarios—to prioritize investments of people, time, and dollars. Requirements for defense against chemical and biological weapons should be based on operationally realistic exposure environments levels of protection should be established to accept casualties that are consistent with those expected from conventional operations spanning similar time and spatial domains. 

The new Defense Planning Guidance specifies that chemical and biological weapons should be considered a likely condition of war.2... 

The second QDR, under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, highlights rising concern about asymmetric challenges to U.S. power and the specific utility of chemical and biological weapons in the hands of adversaries seeking to inhibit U.S. access to their regions.6... 

Your telegram relative to our Symposium on Nonmilitary Defense, Chemical and Biological Defenses in Perspective (not a Symposium on Chemical and Biological Weapons), was read in full before the symposium. Your recognition of the efforts of the ACS Board Committee on Civil Defense is appreciated. 

We were gratified to read in your telegram that you believe that planning for defense against chemical and biological weapons may well need more effort and money. ... 

It is in this role that I should like to discuss what is called public apathy toward defense, more particularly toward its own survival in this era of nuclear and chemical and biological weapons. 

It is on the basis of such reasoning that I feel chemical and biological weapons must be put into their proper perspective as items in our defense arsenal. 

Third, lead time must be shortened for realization of the fact that chemical and biological weapons must be an integral part of our arsenal of defense. Just as we must shorten our technological lead time, so must we have rapid acceptance of the need for total preparedness. 

Perhaps defense against chemical and biological weapons can be shown to have a relatively low marginal cost on top of any shelter program which is undertaken to meet the nuclear threat. This marginal cost might be quite worthwhile to prevent an end run, so to speak, around our defenses. 

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