Challenger disaster, system safety

The actions, policies, and procedures of the corporations involved did not provide an effective systems safety approach commensurate with the risks of the Macondo well. The multiple flawed decisions that led to the blowout indicated a lack of a strong safety culture and a deficient overall systems approach to safety. Industrial management involved with the MacoaAo-Deepwater Horizon disaster failed to appreciate or plan for the safety challenges presented by the Macondo well. 

The Shuttle Challenger disaster represents a real-world example in which an organization, NASA, allowed the bridge between systems engineering and safety that had existed throughout NASA s history, from Mercury to Gemini to Apollo and on to the early development of the shuttle, to collapse. The Safety Breakdown Theory in this case was the result of several biases that contributed to the failure. As described in Chapter 6, The Glismann Effect—in the form of Pressure bias. Feedback bias, and Availability bias—was obviously present ... 

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