Byzantine failure

Byzantine failure This is derived from the Byzantine general rule/problem (Fig. Xl/1.1.2-1). Here, the faulty unit continues to run but produces incorrect results. Byzantine fault is difficult to handle. 

TWO FAILURE FAIL SILENT FAULT ONE FAULT TOLERANT BYZANTINE FAULTS... 

TMR). If in place of three there are N numbers of such selection, then voting is N-modular redundancy (NMR). In this case of TMR, in the case of a double failure (item or voting circuit) output will fail silent fault , whereas in the case of a single fault (in each item or voting circuit) it is a single fault tolerant Byzantine fault. 

The reason that many fault-tolerant systems fail is that their components fail in ways different than assumed in the design of the mechanism for fault tolerance. When the fault-tolerance aspects of the safety case are informal, the failure assumptions may be imprecise, and their probabilities assessed optimistically (Johnson and Holloway 2006). Formal verification forces precision in the statement of failure mode assunqitions and, thereby, explicit recognition of the cases not tolerated - and realistic assessment of their probability. The latter should drive the design of fault-tolerant mechanisms toward those that make minimal assumptions and are uniformly effective (e.g., Byzantine-resilient algorithms) and away finm the special-case treatments that are prevalent in homespun designs. 

---