Accident prevention definitions

As mentioned previously, the study of case histories is an especially important step in the process of accident prevention. To understand these histories, it is helpful to know the definitions of terms that are commonly used in the descriptions (see Table 1-8). 

Starting from the basic definitions in STAMP, the general causes of accidents can be identified using basic systems and control theory. The resulting classification is useful in accident analysis and accident prevention activities. 

The majority of injury and death to fabrication shop employees cannot properly be called accidents because accidents by definition are events which cannot be foreseen and occur by chance. Experience demonstrates that approximately 80% of fabrication shop injuries are preventable. While the time of occurrence can not be accurately predicted, injury in fabrication shops can usually be foreseen. Injury, amputation, and death can be predicted, and will, in almost all cases involve one or more of the following elements ... 

Another definition of an evaluation-case event is "that incident outcome for which an engineered solution or a management system solution could be found that would reasonably prevent its occurrence," or more simply put, an event that could be preventable. All human-caused accidents and the consequences of some natural occurrences (earthquake, wind, waves) can be defined as preventable. However, we are only interested in events where engineering and management system parameters could have prevented the accident provided they are within reasonable control of plant personnel. 

A uniform definition of leading indicators has not yet emerged, although the definitions being touted have the same base. They separate activities to prevent accidents, and the measurement of them, from the measures of outcomes. Consider these definitions. 

Generally speaking, all these improvements lead to a significant reduction in the overall risk of core meltdown in cold shutdown conditions, and to uniform accident sequences and relatively moderate impact on long term accident phases. Specifically, the design of automatic makeup adequately reduces shutdown mode risks (aim of risk reduction linked to short term sequences achieved), and other preventive hardware improvements have proved to be adequate. However, discussions are currently taking place with the French safety authorities to definitively conclude this issue. 

Another issue relative to the FMCSA s definition of an accident is that fault or preventability is not considered. If the accident meets the above definition, the FMCSA is going to consider it an accident. 

During and after the audit the carrier can argue whether an accident should be used in the calculation as only preventable accidents are supposed to be used. If an accident was not preventable, then it shouldn t be used in the calculation. However, the carrier needs to be ready to prove the case for the ones they believe are non-preventable. One key point The FMCSA uses THEIR definition of preventable. Who was at fault has nothing to do with it. The key is proving the driver could not have realistically prevented his or her involvement in the accident. 

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