Theory Reduction and Holism

The idea of holism that accounts for ontological reduction in terms of theory reduction is this If a reduces to b expresses a truth, then it does so because a is relevantly related to a theory t and b is relevantly related to a theory t, and t reduces to t. I will now argue that for a term a to be relevantly related to a theory is for it to have specific semantic properties other than reference (namely, those that are relevant for reduction as construed above), that are relevantly related to t. Thus, it follows that those who embrace this form of holism are committed to the assumption that the relevant semantic facts play a crucial role in reduction-statements. Since the accounts of theory reduction we are familiar with are, on the identity reading, also committed to the tmth of the corresponding metaphysical claims (those expressed by or rendering tme bridge-laws, or statements about analog relations or isomorphisms), holism based on these accounts does not come cheaper than the account presented above. 

Thus, none of the relations offered in the literature (and I am not aware of another candidate) adequately captures the reductive link . None of them makes sense of the directionality of reduction. Instead, we should, in the spirit of Holism, take a look at other features of entire theories that could give rise to the directionality of reduction. Reduction reconciles diversity and directionality with unity. Why not tie diversity to differences between pairs of reducing and reduced theory ... 

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