Stackelberg leader

Cachon and Zipkin (1990), we consider games where each player chooses a stationary policy the retailer s strategy is A and the wholesaler s strategy is order-up-to quantity Q, Three situations arise either the wholesaler or the retailer might have negotiation power in the supply chain and act as Stackelberg leaders, or it is possible that the players have equal power and therefore the solution is in the form of a Nash equilibrium. We will consider all three situations. 

Suppose now that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader and offers the wholesaler a take-it-or-leave-it contract that specifies an amount of money the retailer is willing to spend on customer acquisition. 

Proof Results a), 6), and c) are obtained by a pair-wise comparison of the first-order conditions and employing the fact that dED A)/dA is decreasing in A. Results and > tt, i.e. the Stackelberg leader... 

Yadav SR, Muddada RRMR, Tiwari MK, Shankar R (2009) An algorithm portfolio based solution methodology to solve a supply chain optimization problem. Expert Syst Appl 36 8407-8420 Yang D, Jiao JR, Ji Y, Du G, Helo P, Valente A (2015) Joint optimization for coordinated configuration of product families and supply chains by a leader-follower Stackelberg game. Eur J Oper Res 246 263-280... 

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