Reduction as Grounding - The Second Argument

Jenkins argument seems to rely on strategic considerations (Jenkins 2011, 269f. -here adapted to the present list of examples) A reductive interpretation of examples similar to those on the list discussed in the previous section seems at least conceivable. If so, and if we want our notion of dependence or grounding to cover 

prima facie, a number of, but not all cases that seem to be adequately describ-able in terms of grounding are conceptually compatible with or even perfectly match a reductionist interpretation. If so, then grounding comes in two forms, in a reductionist and in a non-reductionist form. The (more general) grounding relation is then underdetermined with respect to the issue of identity. 

The grounding debate is one of the last in which hue armchair philosophy seems to flourish. Let us now turn to a final application of the explication of reduction, an application to interventionist models of causation and dependence. This debate comprises two aspects, at least. First, it aims at a counterfactual 

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