Reduction and Explanatory Unification

The explanatory priority of the property structures given in the explanans of a reductive explanation corresponds to the degree to which these properties are responsible for how the reduced object behaves. One interesting form of explanatory 

Recall the distinctions suggested in the introduction concerning the connection between realist/anti-reaUst and conservative/eliminative versions of reductionism, that correspond to different interpretations of the alleged truth or relevance of high-level theories or sciences (see Table 9.1). 

Conservatism Monism-3 Epistemic/pragmatic Monism-4 Conservative 

One cognitive role of high-level descriptions (which shows that they are indispensable in one respect) can nicely be illustrated using a quote from Lennon (1992)  

The distinct physical groundings of a given intentional kind will be shapeless from the viewpoint of physical theory. [... ] Our classifications into intentional kinds provides a pattern of conceptualization which yields empirical generalizations and conditional dependencies. These patterns of dependency are at the heart of causal explanation, and could not be captured without the employment of intentional notions. (Lennon 1992,226) 

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