Quasi-noumenal

There is no reason why the internal realist could not help herself to the notion of supervenience. It requires no match between entities carved out in different conceptual schemes, as the first attempted reply. It does not call for stepping outside all conceptual schemes into the quasi-noumenal realm of stuff to be organized, as the second attempted solution. So the answer to the question is roughly this. Two conceptual schemes share the same domain if the entities described in one of them supervene on the entities described in the other one. There is only one thing that might be cause for concern. How do we know that the supervenience relation actually obtains The problem is exacerbated by the fact that supervenience claims are modal claims. (If there is a mental difference, there must be some physical difference.) This question has not received much attention. Fortunately, I will not have to attempt to solve it now, for it is not a special problem for internal realism. It is a problem for all positions which employ the notion of (modal) supervenience. I trust that if it is solved, the solution can be accepted by the internal realist as well. (The issue of sharing a domain will be discussed in more detail in 5.1.)... 

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