Popper and Historical Analyses

Since the publication over a quarter of a century ago of my original paper Philosophical Foundations of Classical Evolutionary Classification, I have become increasingly interested in systems of explanation in science and especially in evolutionary biology (see Bock, 1978, 1981, 1988, 1991, 1992, 2000 Szalay and Bock, 1991). This was prompted by concerns in 1974 when I introduced into systematics Popper s ideas that the nature of explanation and the methods of testing theoretical statements in classification and phylogeny do not fit easily or at all into the Popperian mold. 

There was also the matter of the frequently expressed accusation that Popper claimed that all of evolutionary biology was historical and hence nonscientific and that he had subsequently recanted this claim. This claim appeared to stem from Popper s (1957 see especially pp. 105-119) The Poverty of Historicism. If one reads this volume carefully, it is clear that Popper makes the error of regarding all aspects of evolutionary theory or evolutionary biology as historical, which would make it impossible to formulate general laws about evolution similar to those in physics and chemistry. It is equally clear that Popper s position is quite definite (1957 143) that history is characterized by its interest in actual, 

Hull (1999) has performed an important service in his analysis of Popperian ideas and their relationship to biology and especially evolutionary biology. Hull s analysis would have been clearer had he included a discussion of Darwin s five theories and thereby provided a clarification of which parts of evolutionary theory are historical and which are not. Nevertheless, Hull points out (1999 498) that it is ironic that cladists have adopted Popperian ideas because of Popper s absolute stance against induction in scientific testing and against the notion that there are theory-free facts. 

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Fields within Evolutionary Biology Popper and Historical Analyses Explanations in Science... 

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