P instantiation

Now if we hold on to the idea of mind-body supervenience, Kim argues, we know that M occurs because its supervenience base P occurs, and as long as P occurs, M must occur no matter what other events preceded this instance of M - in particular, regardless of whether or not an instance of M preceded it (1998 42). Thus, because of mind-body supervenience, whatever physical base P instantiates M, it will be sufficient for M s... 

This is actually not quite right. Because M is multiply realizable, M could have occurred even if P had not occurred in the case where some physical property other than P instantiated M. So M could have had a different supervenience base other than P, say P2. The point is that M needs some sort of physical supervenience base to instantiate it and cannot occur independently of its supervenience base. Whatever supervenience base does instantiate M, it will be related to M by supervenience, and it and M will not be independent of one another. 

So, here s the exclusion argument itself Suppose that some M-instantiation causes an TVf-instantiation. By supervenience, we know that the -instantiation has a physical supervenience base, But P -instantiation is nomologicaUy sufficient for AP-instantiation. It therefore appears that Af and P each have a claim to being responsible for the instantiation of Af on this occasion, and the two claims appear to be in tension with each other. The only plausible way to resolve this tension is to conclude that the Af-instantiation causes the AP-instantiation by causing a P-instantiation. But, again by supervenience, Afhas a supervenience base, P. By the causal closure of the physical, the P-instantiation must have a complete physical cause — presumably, the P-instantiation. But now P and M are in direct competition for being the cause of the P-instantiation. ... 

---