Stolen nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapon stolen from the military arsenal of a nuclear power... 

Another tremendous threat is nuclear explosives, either stolen or improvised. A modern nuclear weapon could kill many millions of people. Even an improvised weapon in New York, on the level of the first-generation weapon used in World War II, could kill a million people. Additionally, there would be complete destruction of a 10-square-kilometer region and hundreds of thousands of people would be exposed to lethal fallout within the first hour. The devastation, however, is limited in extent, unlike a bioterrorism event, placing nuclear weapons second on the list of worrisome scenarios. 

Improvised Nuclear Devices and Stolen Nuclear Weapons... 

Detonation of an improvised or stolen nnclear weapon by terrorists is the worst-case radiological attack scenario (5). Althongh difficnlt to construct, due to requirements for sophisticated engineering and expertise, an improvised nuclear device could produce a yield similar to the Hiroshima bomb, with release or radiation, blast, thermal pulses, and radioactive fallout (1). At a minimum, a small nuclear detonation could cause damage equal or exceeding the September 11 attacks in New York City. Even if the nuclear detonation were unsuccessful, the conventional explosion associated with the device could cause significant environmental contamination with the nuclear weapons material, such as plutonium or uranium (1). 

Federal agencies in the United States report that more than 1,000 sealed radiation sources have been reported stolen, missing, or simply unaccounted for. There are many more sources missing worldwide, and the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) is attempting to recover as many as possible. According to the IAEA, there are thousands of radiation sources (including nuclear weapons) unaccounted for within the former USSR. 

Some NFA investigators believe that too much focus is placed on the IND post-det scenario at present. Their opinion is that, should such a catastrophe become reality, the counterterrorism enterprise of any organization had failed in a most fundamental way, and perhaps more assets should have been devoted to enhanced surveillance, improved radiation instrumentation, device detection, etc. A similar view is sometimes expressed for source NFA in the pre-det arena. Although very important to know the identity and isotopic composition of a radioactive threat, additional source analyses would perhaps provide nuclear production details, facility identification, and the time since last chemical processing. However, were the material or an assembled weapon stolen, such source information would likely be but nominally productive in attribution efforts. Indeed, only pre- or post-det (RDD) route analyses have the potential to identify terrorist personnel and places of interest, a point sometimes unappreciated by NFA programmatic efforts. 

Nowadays, average citizens are somewhat less obsessed with the nuclear threat. Most world leaders likewise seem less preoccupied with the idea that radioactive weapons of mass destraction still pose an imminent danger, although countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to evoke considerable anxiety. Indeed, some unstable nations have stolen or bought the secrets of nuclear bomb making and even brag about their atomic capabilities, hinting darkly that, if provoked, they would not hesitate to use them. 

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